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IN DEFENSE OF IMPLIED INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 
IN CONSTITUTIONAL CASES 
John F. Preis* 
ABSTRACT 
If Congress has neither authorized nor prohibited a suit to enforce the Constitution, 
may the federal courts create one nonetheless? At present, the answer mostly turns on 
the form of relief sought: if the plaintiff seeks damages, the Supreme Court will nor-
mally refuse relief unless Congress has specifically authorized it; in contrast, if the 
plaintiff seeks an injunction, the Court will refuse relief only if Congress has specifi-
cally barred it. These contradictmy approaches naturally invite arguments for reform. 
Two common arguments-one based on the historical relationship between law and 
equity and the other based on separation of powers principles--could quite foreseeably 
combine to end implied injunctive relief as we know it. 
In this Article, I defend the federal courts' power to issue injunctions in con-
stitutional cases without explicit congressional authorization-a practice known as 
"implying" a suit for relief. The defense rests on two proofs, both largely historicaL 
First, I show that the historical relationship between law and equity has largely been 
misunderstood in the realm of injunctive relief. Second, I show that implied injunctive 
relief does not contravene separation of powers principles because Congress and the 
federal courts have, since the Founding, viewed implied injunctive relief as permissible 
and even appropriate. These proofs do not account for policy concerns that might im-
pact the inquiry, but they do suggest that such concerns must be extraordinarily com-
pelling to overcome the federal courts' centuries-old power to imply injunctive relief 
in constimtional cases. 
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II'\TRODUCTION 
It is one thing to have a constitution, but it is quite another to enforce it. What is 
needed is some mechanism to make rights written on paper-what James Madison 
called mere "parchment barriers"--come alive in the lives of individual persons. 1 In 
the United States, one of the most prominent enforcement tools is the civil rights action, 
an action brought by the victim of a constitutional violation against the perpetrator. In 
such actions, the Constitution is made real through either damages or injunctive relief. 
Who is in charge of civil rights actions? Congress, mostly. Congress has the power 
to create or abolish civil rights actions, and barring narrow exceptions, the federal 
courts are obliged to follow such choices.2 In regulating these actions, Congress does 
not create or abolish the constitutional rights themselves, of course; it merely defines 
the avenues through which the rights shall be enforceable. If a plaintiff wants to know 
the remedies available for a constitutional violation, therefore, the best place to look 
is in the U.S. Code. 
The U.S. Code is the best place to look, but it is not the only place. If the statute 
books do not create or prohibit a suit for relief, plaintiffs frequently tum to the federal 
1 THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 424 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter 1961). 
2 See, e.g., Laufv. E. G. Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323, 329-30 (1938) (holding that 
Congress may bar the federal courts from enjoining labor strikes, even where a case presents 
a constitutional issue). The federal comts need not follow a congressional bar on civil rights 
actions if such actions are needed to "maintain[] a regime of lawful govemment." Daniel J. 
Meltzer & Richard H. Fallon, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 
104 HARV. L. REv. 1731, 1779 (1991 ). While less than ideal, such a regime can tolerate "the 
denial of particular remedies, and sometimes of individual redress." ld. 
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courts for assistance. Plaintiffs in these circumstances will ask the courts to create-or 
"imply"-a civil rights action on their own. At present, the availability of implied ac-
tions depends, strangely enough, on whether the relief sought is monetary or injunctive. 
Suits for monetary relief are typically difficult to obtain from the courts. In the Supreme 
Court's view, creating an action for damages is a legislative task, not a judicial one.3 
Justice Scalia put it most memorably in a frequently quoted 2001 concurrence, stating 
that the implied damages action is "a relic of the heady days in which this Court as-
sumed common-law powers to create causes of action-decreeing them to be 'implied' 
by the mere existence of a statutory or constitutional prohibition. "4 
Suits for injunctive relief, in contrast, are much easier to obtain. In the absence of 
congressional direction, the Court is typically comfortable "assum[ing] common-law 
powers" to create such actions. Instead of demanding congressional authorization, the 
Court simply asks the "straightforward" question "whether [the] complaint alleges 
an ongoing violation of federal law. "5 If such a violation exists, and Congress has not 
affirmatively barred the action, then a suit for injunctive relief will be available. 
This incongruous approach to implied constitutional actions has naturally given 
rise to arguments for change. One group of scholars has argued the Court's stingy 
approach to damages ignores the historic relationship between law and equity. For 
hundreds of years, the argument goes, damages have been considered the ''ordinary" 
remedy for a violation of law while injunctive relief has been considered a "drastic 
and extraordinary" remedy. 6 This historic relationship, which has never been affirma-
tively disclaimed, suggests that damages should be at least as available as injunctions, 
if not more. To arrange the doctrine differently "gets the traditional interplay between 
law and equity exactly backwards."' If the Court is to respect history, therefore, it 
should dramatically increase the availability of implied constitutional damages. 
3 See, e.g., Bush v. Lucas, 462U.S. 367,389-90 (1983);seealso Alex Reinert& Lumen 
N. Mulligan, Asking the First Question: Reframing Bivens after Minneci, 90 WASH. UNIV. 
L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 8-1 available at http://w'Ww.ssm.com/abstract 
=2042175 (explaining the separation of powers concerns underlying the Court's implied 
damages jurisprudence). 
4 Corr. Sen·s. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61,75 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice 
Scalia recently repeated his view in the 2011 term. See Minneci v. Pollard, 132 S. Ct. 617, 
626 (2012) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
5 Va. Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 131 S. Ct. 1632, 1639 (2011) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
6 Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743,2761 (2010) ("An injtmction is 
a drastic and extraordinary remedy, which should not be granted as a matter of course. Bivens 
v. Six Unkno\Xtn Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388,395 ( 1971) ("Historically, damages have 
been regarded as the ordinary remedy for an invasion of personal interests in liberty."). 
7 Gene R. Nichol, Bivens, Chilicky, and Constitutional Damages Claims, 75 VA. L. 
REV. 1117, 1135 (1989); see also Susan Bandes, Reinventing Bivens: The Self-Executing 
Constitution, 68 S. CA.L. L.REv. 289,301 (1995) (arguing that the "most damning argument" 
against the Court's stingy damages jurisprudence is how it "perverts the usual treatment of 
damages"); Marsha S. Berzon, Securing Fragile Foundations: Affirmative Constitutional 
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This is one response to the incongruity, but there is another. Instead of making 
damages actions more available, the Court could instead withdraw the easy avail-
ability of injunctive actions, thus making them harder to obtain than damages actions. 
This response would not only pay heed to the historical relationship between the two 
actions, but it would also pay heed to separation of powers principles-principles 
that have long animated implied damages actions but which, inexplicably, have been 
absent from implied equitable actions. 8 
There is good reason to think the Court might ultimately choose this latter path. 
Just last term, the Court heard an important case involving implied injunctive relief. 
In Douglas v. Independent Living Center ofSouthern California,9 a plaintiff asked the 
Court to imply an injunctive action under the Supremacy Clause. 10 The Court found a 
way to duck the issue, 11 but Chief Justice Roberts dissented for himself and Justices 
Scalia, Thomas, and Ali to. The dissenters would have rejected the plaintiffs request be-
cause Congress had not authorized such an action and for the Court to do so on its own 
"would raise the most serious concems regarding ... the separation of powers ... . " 12 
Adjudication in the Federal Courts, 84 N.Y.U. L. REv. 681,713-15 (2009) (arguing that the 
Court's approach to damages "invert[ s] the traditional understanding of equity" and that the 
Court's "inflexible dichotomy between prospective and retrospective ... constitutional suits 
[cmmot] be justified"); Walter E. Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a 
Sword, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1532, 1542-43 (1972) ("lfa federal court acting tmder a general 
grant ofjurisdiction may appropriately give equitable relief based upon the Constitution, there 
is no readily apparent reason why the same court would not have similar power to grant a remedy 
at law in cases in which such a remedy might be appropriate for the effectuation of a consti-
tutional guarantee."); H. Miles Foy, III, Some Reflections on Legislation, Adjudication, and 
Implied Private Actions in the State and Federal Courts, 71 CORNELL L. REv. 501, 578 ( 1986) 
("Furthermore, if the defendant might, in theory, be enjoined from violating the legislation, 
what reason could be given for denying the plaintiffthe less intrusive remedy of damages?"). 
R Professor Richard Fallon recently noted the absence of separation of powers concerns 
in the Court's implied injunctionjurispmdence: 
The Court ... has treated suits for injunctions against ongoing consti-
tutional violations strikingly differently trom [constitutional damages] 
actions. In cutting back on [damages actions], the Court has said that the 
decision whether to authorize damages remedies for constitutional vio-
lations is more appropriately made by Congress than the comts and that 
judges should be wary of recognizing "implied" causes of action. By 
contrast, the post-Brown Court, so far as I am aware, has never suggested 
that injunctions against ongoing constitutional violations are constitu-
tionally problematic in the way it now believes [damages] actions to be. 
Richard Fallon, Jurisdiction Stripping Reconsidered, 96 VA. L. REV. 1043, 1113 (2011 ). 
9 132 S. Ct. 1204 (2012). 
10 ld. at 1208-09. 
11 After oral argument but before an opinion had been issued, a federal agency changed its 
view of the applicable law, thus substantially altering the question presented. A five-justice 
majority thus remanded the case to the lower courts for consideration of the new question 
presented. See id. at 1208. 
12 ld. at 1213 (Roberts, C.J ., dissenting). 
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Though Roberts's position only commanded four votes, there is good reason to believe 
that a fifth vote is well within reach. 13 
To be sure, Roberts's dissent in Douglas is narrow. It stops short of sweeping away 
all implied injunctive relief in constitutional cases, preferring instead to focus only on 
Supremacy Clause claims. The dissent does, however, highlight the potential force of 
separation of powers logic in this field. 14 As Professor Stephen Vladeck has argued, 
"Taken to its logical extreme, the Chief[] [Justice's] reasoning might even extend 
to suits for injunctive reliefto enforce specific constitutional provisions (such as the 
Fourth Amendment)," rather than simply Supremacy Clause cases. 15 
Thus, if the Court truly cares about the historical relationship between law and 
equity, and truly cares about deferring to congressional prerogatives, it may not be 
long before implied injunctive relief is no longer available in constitutional cases. 
In this Article, I explain why this reasoning is flawed and why the federal courts 
have the power to imply injunctive relief in constitutional cases. I do so by tracing 
the remedy's long development from fifteenth-century England to twentieth-century 
America. This development shows that: ( 1) the availability of implied monetary relief 
and the availability of implied injlmctive relief have not been tightly bound together in 
any particular relationship and (2) federal courts having jurisdiction over a dispute have, 
from the Founding, enjoyed the power to create injunctive actions without explicit 
authorization from Congress. Together, these points rebut any suggestion that implied 
injunctive relief should be curtailed on historical and separation of powers grounds. 
This defense of implied injunctive relief is valuable for two important reasons. 
First, much ofthe cmrent scholarship on the availability of injunctive relief in con-
stimtional enforcement focuses not on the history of equity, but on the costs and bene-
fits of injunctive relief. 16 This is valuable work, but the Court cares deeply about history 
in this field, having repeatedly defined its equitable powers as equal to those of the 
"High Court ofChance1y in England at the time ofthe adoption ofthe Constitution."17 
13 Stephen I. Vladeck, Douglas and the Fate ofEx Parte Young, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 
13, 14 (2012), http:/lw'Ww.yalelawjournal.org/2012/04/30/vladeck.html (arguing that, because 
"Justice Kennedy ... had ... argued for an analogous result in [a prior case], there may 
already be five votes" in favor of Chief Justice Robelts's view). 
14 See Douglas, 132 S. Ct. at 1213 (Robelts, C.J., dissenting). 
15 See Vladeck, supra note 13, at 17. 
16 See, e.g., John C. JetTries, Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 YALE 
L.J. 87, 90 (1999) (arguing that "limitations on damages, together with modern expansions 
of injunctive relief ... [create] a rolling redistribution of wealth from older to younger, as the 
societal investment in constitutional law is channeled toward future progress and away trom 
backward looking relief'). See generally Eugene Kontorovich, Liability Rulesfor Constitutional 
Rights: The Case ofklass Detentions, 56 STAN. L. REV. 755 (2004) (arguing that, in certain 
contexts, damages are preferable to injunctions in constitutional enforcement because high 
transaction costs prevent efficient equitable remedies). 
17 Gmpo Mexicano de Desarrollo v. Alliance Bond Fund, 527 U.S. 308, 318 (1999) 
("[E]quity jurisdiction ofthe federal comts is the jurisdiction in equity exercised by the High 
Court of Chancery in England at the time ofthe adoption ofthe Constitution. . . . see also, 
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Second, the defense contributes new authority to the ongoing debate over the legiti-
macy of"constitutional common law," a species oflaw that includes "remedial rules 
drawing their inspiration and authority from, but not required by ... various consti-
tutional provisions. " 18 Scholars have long debated whether such judicial lawmaking 
(implied constitutional actions being merely one example) is permissible and this 
Article provides significant evidence that the Founding Generation would have seen 
implied injunctive relief as legitimate. 19 
The Article proceeds chronologically in three steps. Part I begins in England hun-
dreds of years before America was founded. It traces legal and equitable actions from 
their founding to the eighteenth century and shows that the two actions were not closely 
tied together in any particular relationship. The Article then turns to America in Part II. 
That Part shows how equity's detachment from the law was carried over to America, 
both by congressional edict and judicial practice. Untethered from legal actions, fed-
eral equitable actions thus grew into powerful tools of constitutional enforcement dur-
ing the late nineteenth century and largely remain with us today. Part III then addresses 
the modem era. This was an era of statute, and the survival of implied injunctive re-
lief thus mmed on whether Congress's legislative directives explicitly or implicitly 
deprived the courts of their power to issue the remedy. None of the major legislation 
during this era accomplished this deprivation20 and the authority to create injunctive 
actions thus remains intact today. 
e.g., Stainback v. Mo Hock Ke Lok Po, 336 U.S. 368, 382 n.26 (1949); Guaranty Trust Co. 
v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 105 (1945); Atlas Life lns. Co. v. W. l. lnc., 306 U.S. 563, 568 
(1939); Gordon v. Washington, 295 U.S. 30, 36 (1935). There are two articles that do look 
at the issue historically. See Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., Article Ill and the Cause of Action, 89 
low A L. REV. 777 (2004) (discussing judicial implied relief in England and early America); 
John Harrison, Ex Parte Young, 60 STAN. L. REv. 989 (2008) (discussing the federal comts' 
exercise of equitable jurisdiction in the early twentieth centrny). Both articles are important, but 
neither focuses specifically on English equity in the eighteenth century or American equity in 
the nineteenth century-both of which are foundational to the federal courts' modem approach 
to implied injunctive relief. 
18 Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 197 4 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Common 
Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1975). 
19 See generally RICHARD FALLON, IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION ( 2001) (describing 
and defending the judicial creation of doctrinal tools used to implement constitutional norms); 
Joseph Grano, Prophylactic Rules in Criminal Procedure: A Question ofArticle 111 Legitimacy, 
80 Nw. U. L. REv. 100, 134 (1985) (arguing that federal courts have no authority to "impose im-
plementing 'details' that are not constitutionally required"); Thomas W. Merrill, The Common 
Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1985) (providing a framework for 
dete1mining when federal comts may exercise a law-making function); Gillian E. Metzger, 
Ordinary Administrative Law as Constitutional Common Law, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 4 79 
(2010) (arguing that constitutional concerns are pervasive in administrative law and the 
resulting doctrine is a type of constitutional common law); Thomas S. Schrock & Robelt C. 
Welsh, Reconsidering The Constitutional Common Law, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1117, 1138--40 
(1978) (challenging the legitimacy of constitutional common law). 
20 See infra Part lll. 
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Although the past exerts immense power over the Court's current approach to 
implied injunctive relief, policy concems should not be ignored. These concems-
ranging from democratic accountability1 to economic efficiency2-could conceiv-
ably militate against implying injunctive relief. I do not consider those arguments here. 
Instead, I merely argue that if the Court intends to pay heed to the historical roots of 
its power-as it so often professes to do in this field-the case for a judicial power 
to enjoin unconstitutional conduct is extraordinarily strong. 
I. LAW Al'\0 EQUITY IN ENGLAND 
The fate of implied injunctive relief today depends in large part on the past. Not 
only do arguments for reform depend on the historical relationship between law and 
equity, but the Supreme Court itself has declared over and over again that the ''equity 
jurisdiction of the federal courts is the jurisdiction in equity exercised by the High 
Court of Chancery in England at the time of the adoption of the Constimtion. "23 It 
is essential, therefore, to understand the origins and growth of English equity. 
This Part takes on that task. It describes how legal and equitable causes of action 
came to exist and, in particular, how equity regarded the common law. This discus-
sion yields two central insights. First, the existence of an equitable cause of action was 
not necessarily dependent on a legal cause of action. 24 Courts of equity had the authority 
to, and did in fact, create causes of action in cases where courts oflaw would not issue 
damages. This suggests that the two causes sometimes lived separate lives and that we 
should be hesitant to yoke the two remedies together. Second, although courts of equity 
professed a willingness to adhere to common law rights and defer to legal remedies, this 
deference was narrowly practiced and effectivelyuncheckable.25 Equitable remedies 
thus issued as a matter of course in several categories of cases, making them far less 
"extraordinary" than typically believed. 
A. Lmv 
It is often best to start at the very begi1ming. In the realm of English adjudication, 
the very beginning is 1066, the year ofthe Norman Conquest. Before that time, disputes 
in what was to become England were resolved primarily through a cmde system of 
21 See generally Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 Yl\LE 
L.J. 1346 (2006) (arguing that judicialla\Xtmaking is unwise in part because it is democrati-
cally illegitimate). 
22 See, e.g., Kontorovich, supra note 16, at 823-24 (arguing that damages will be more 
efficient than injunctive relief in certain circumstances). 
23 Gmpo Mexicano de Desarrollo v. Alliance Bond Fund, 527U .S. 308, 318 (1999); see 
also, e.g., Stainbackv. Mo Hock Ke Lok Po, 336 U.S. 368,382 n.26 (1949); GuarantyTmst 
Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 105 (1945); Atlas Life Ins. Co. v. W.l. S., Inc., 306 U.S. 563,568 
(1939); Gordon v. Washington, 295 U.S. 30, 36 (1935). 
24 See infra Part I.B.1. 
25 See infra Part l.B.2. 
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"communaljustice."26 Justice was had, or not, at the hands of a "folk-assembly" gath-
ered at the local village or manor.27 Disputants might be persuaded by their neighbors 
to give up their differences, or the crowd might appeal to supematural authority for 
intervention.28 If the gathering failed to yield a resolution, the parties would be left to 
muddle on. After the Norman Conquest, however, an altemative avenue of resolution 
presented itself: a direct appeal to the king. 
Take, for example, a dispute from the year 1114. In that year, Richard, the Abbot 
of York, was at odds with a man by the name of Geoffrey de Spineto?9 Mr. Spineto 
had been fishing in the lake ofHomsea, a lake the monastery claimed it had received 
as an estate gift years earlier. 30 Apparently having no luck with local resolution, the 
Abbot appealed to King Henry I for assistance.31 The Abbot explained the situation 
to the King, who then resolved the matter by issuing a "writ. 'm A writ was simply a 
letter from the crown ordering that some act be taken.33 In the Abbot's case, the writ 
decreed that ''Richard abbot of York shall hold freely the [lake] of Homsea. "34 
By the twelfth century, ''knights and abbots [were] constantly rushing to the king, 
trying to obtain a writ of prompt redress for some alleged wrong. "35 The process be-
came so common that the king handed the process off to his close assistant, the lord 
chancellor. 36 The chancellor in tum began to issue writs to local officials, each writ de-
scribing the "steps to be taken to determine a controversy or secure a right. 'm There 
was no formal law at this point. Local officials simply resolved disputes according to 
the instructions in the writ, as well as general notions of what was "right," according to 
"reason, religion, [and] morals as well as ... established and unmistakable custom."3" 
As the cenmries passed, certain types of disputes occurred routinely enough that 
the chancellor stopped issuing distinct writs for each case. Instead, Chance1y (the office 
26 J. H. BAKER, INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGl\L HISTORY 4 (1979). 
27 ld. 
2R ld. at 4-5. 
29 See WilliamFaner,An OutlineltineraryofHenryl, 34ENG.HIST. REv. 303,370 (1914). 
30 ld. 
31 ld. 
32 ld. 
33 MAX RADIN, HANDBOOK OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 179 ( 1936). 
34 Faner, supra note 29, at 370. 
35 R.C. VAN CAENEGEM, ROYAL WRITS IN ENGLAND FROM THE CONQUEST TO GLANVILL 
241 (1959). 
36 Thomas 0. Main, Traditional Equity and Contemporaty Procedure, 78 WASH. L. REv. 
429, 441 (2003). 
37 RADIN, supra note 33, at 179; see also S.F.C. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
THE COMMON LAw 22 ( 1969) (explaining that tree tenants could go to royal court to obtain 
a writ "directing the lord to do right to them"). 
38 RADIN, supra note 33, at 181. Often, the writ would simply order the judge to "do 
right" by the injured party. See MILSOM,supra note 37, at22; VANCAENEGEM, supra note 35, 
at 486 ("I order you to do full1ight to the abbot of Abington, in respect of his sluice which, the 
men of Stanton have broken. 
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of the chancellor) created a variety of standardized writs.39 Each writ contained a 
"complete set of substantive, procedural, and evidentiary law, determining who has to 
do what to obtain the unique remedy the writ specifies for particular circumstances."40 
For example, if a person suffered a punch in the face, he would likely pursue the stan-
dardized writ oftrespass viet armis. 41 That writ promised a plaintiff damages, but only 
if the plaintiff presented the evidence listed in the writ, and did so in the manner de-
fined by the writ.42 
Taken together, the collection of writs enforceable in English courts oflaw com-
prised the common lmv. Lawyers and jurists, however, did not think of the law in the 
categorical terms we do today. There was no such thing as ''tort law," for example; 
there was only a set of writs that addressed interference with the person.43 Nor was 
there a general law of"civil procedure," for each writ came with its own ''mini civil 
procedure system."44 The same went for rules of evidence as well as remedies.45 
If a writ was applicable to a plaintiffs case, the plaintiff was said to have a ''cause 
of action. "46 Thus, a person who suffered a punch in the face was said to have a "cause 
of action for trespass vi et armis. "47 Our modem ears have become numbed to the 
phrase "cause of action," but if it is studied for a moment, the phrase is actually quite 
descriptive. To say that a victim of physical abuse had a "cause of action" in eighteenth-
century England was to say that the plaintiff had sufficient "cause" for taking some 
"action" in court. His lawsuit was justified because a preexisting writ permitted him 
39 Sherman Steele, The Origin and Nature ofEquity Jurisprudence, 6 AM. L. SCH. REV. 
10, 10-11 (1926) ("An action was begun by the issuance of a vvrit appropriate to the fmm of 
action; in time these writs became standardized."); Vl'u"' CAENEGEM, supra note 35, at 178. 
40 H. Brent McKnight, How Then Shall We Reason, The Historical Setting ofEquity, 45 
MERCER L. REV. 919, 929 (1994). 
41 JOHN H. Ll\.NGBEIN ET l\.L., HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW: THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
ANGLOMIERICANLEGALINSTITUTIONS 103-04 (2009) (explaining that this type ofvvritwas 
obtained for a \X~Tong committed "with force and arms"). 
42 ld. 
43 BAlCER, supra note 26, at 49 ("There was a law of writs before there was a law of 
propelty, or of contract, or of tolt."); see also PAUL BRAND, THE MAKING OF THE COMMON 
LAW 96-97 (1992) ("The use of standard forms of\X~Tit ... helped to point judges and law-
yers in the direction of conceptualizing English law in te1ms of a series of discrete fmms of 
action, each corresponding to one particular type of \X~Tit, each offering a particular type of 
remedy for particular constellations of factual circumstance .... 
44 LANGBEIN, supra note 41, at 96. 
45 Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909,915 ( 1987) ("Distinct procedural 
characteristics developed for different \\Tits. Each \\Tit implied a wide range of procedural, 
remedial, and evidentiary incidents, such as subject matter and personal jurisdiction, burden 
of proof, and methods of execution."). 
46 ld. at 935 ("The term 'cause of action' was at least as old as the fifteenth century. Like 
the forms of action under the \X~Tit system, the term implied a set of circumstances for which 
there was a known remedy."). 
47 LANGBEIN, supra note 41, at 103-04. 
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an avenue for a specific type of relief. 48 We are in the habit today of separating the 
cause of action from substantive right, procedure, and remedy, but that was not the 
practice in England. Right, procedure, and remedy were all wrapped into one-together 
called the "writ." If the events giving rise to a plaintiffs injury were described in the 
writ, the plaintiff was able to prove them in the manner specified by the writ, and the 
plaintiff desired the remedy dictated by the writ, the plaintiff had a cause of action. If 
the plaintiffs case could not be fit within a writ, he was out ofluck because common-
law judges had little power to modifY writs to fit new circumstances.49 
B. Equity 
Although the common-law courts were a vast improvement over the ''communal 
justice" system that existed before 1066, the courts still drew criticism. Writs did not 
cover every injustice and, by the fourteenth century, Chancery had stopped issuing 
new writs. 5° Moreover, even when a writ applied, its "precise and technical rules" 
might put reliefbeyond reach. 51 Dissatisfaction with the courts led prospective litigants 
to skip the courts and appeal directly to the king for relief. 52 The king, of course, was 
not confined by the terms of any writ. 53 He was free to issue whatever order he desired, 
just as he had originally done soon after theN onnan invasion. 54 In the thirteenth and 
fourteenth centuries, as more and more plaintiffs bypassed the common-law courts and 
came to him directly for relief, the king began (again) referring the disputes to the lord 
chancellor. 55 Instead of issuing a new writ to address the plaintiffs' claims, the chan-
cellor began to resolve the disputes on his own. 56 
48 BRAND, supra note 43, at 96 ("[L]itigants were allowed to initiate litigation only 
through a [recognized] w:tit." (emphasis added)); 1 JOSEPH STORY, COM!viENTARIES ON EQUITY 
JURISPRUDENCE, AS ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 20 (8th ed. 1861) ("In the 
courts of common law, both of England and America, there are certain prescribed forms of 
action [i.e., \X~Tits], to which the party must resort to furnish him a remedy; and, ifthere be 
no prescribed form to reach such a case, he is remediless. Bellia, supra note 17, at 786 
("To establish that one had a cause of action under English common law ... one had toes-
tablish the facts that entitled one to judicial relief through an established form of proceeding 
[i.e., \X~Tit]."). 
49 See Main, supra note 36, at 440 ("[P]recise and technical rules ofpleadings, procedure 
and proof cabined judicial discretion" at common law.). 
50 ld. at 442-43. 
51 ld. at 440 ("[T]he universe of writs was fixed and their construction by law judges nar-
rowly circumscribed; precise and technical rules of pleadings, procedure and proofcabined 
judicial discretion within the form of action. Judges were forbidden to depart from the 
terms of the writ. See F. W. MAITLAt"'D, EQUITY, ALSO, THE FORMS OF ACTIONS AT COMMON 
LAW 298 ("In the Middle Ages discretion [in the realm of\X~Tits] is entirely excluded; all is to 
be fixed by iron mles. 
52 See Main, supra note 36, at 440-41. 
53 ld. at 441. 
54 ld. 
55 ld. 
56 ld. at 441-42. 
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By the fourteenth century, a distinct court arose under the chancellor-the Court 
ofChancery.57 Chancery practice at the begi1ming was free-form; plaintiffs simply had 
to tell the chancellor their story. sx The chancellor was usually an ecclesiastic, not a 
trained lawyer. 59 As such, he issued relief on ethical, not legal, grounds. 60 His "primary 
function and concern was not with the [plaintiff] but with the [defendant] and the good 
of his soul. "61 If the defendant had acted contrary to fundamental principles of justice 
(as determined by the chancellor) the plaintiffprevailed.62 Unlike colllllion-law courts, 
juries had no role in equity. 63 Nor, for many centuries, did stare decisis. 64 Judgments 
conformed only to the view of the presiding chancellor, a system of justice that some 
derided as arbitrary. 65 
Over time, Chance1y' s decisions fell into a rough pattern such that there came to 
be a vaguely definable "law of equity. "66 With this development, an equitable "cause 
of action" could be said to exist. That is, there existed multiple situations in which, 
given Chancery's historic propensity to act, plaintiffs had "cause" for taking "action" 
in that court. 67 
Plaintiffs had cause for going to Chancery in two types of situations. One situation 
involved the enforcement of claims created anew by equity. Take, for example, the law 
of tmsts and mortgages. Chancery developed this law as the feudal system declined 
and new forms of property ownership became desirable.68 The common law, with its 
rigid adherence to stare decisis and writ practice, was unable to adapt to these new 
Steele, supra note 39, at 11 (noting that the "practice of referring to the Chancellor all 
of these special appeals to the king led to the establishment of a tribtmal which by the time of 
Edward III (1327-13 77) had become recognized as a distinct and permanent court, with its 
separate jurisdiction and mode of procedure and its seat at Westminster"). 
58 Main, supra note 36, at 442-43 n.80. 
59 HENRY L. MCCLINTOCK, HANDBOOK OF EQUITY 4 (1936). 
60 See WILLIAM F. WALSH, A TREATISE ON EQUITY 4 (1930); Subrin, supra note 45, at 
918-19 ("The Equity Court became knmvn as the Court of Conscience. Like ecclesiastical 
cmrrts, it operated directly on the defendant's conscience. 
61 A.W.B. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT: THE RISE OF THE 
ACTION OF ASSUMPSIT 398-99 (1975). 
62 ld. at 399. 
63 LAu"'GBEIN, supra note 41, at 289-90. 
64 ld. at 351-53 (describing the "doctrinalization" of Chancery in the eighteenth century). 
65 The most famous critique is likely that of John Selden: 
Equity is A Roguish thing, for Law [we] have a measure .... Equity is 
according to [the] conscience of him [that] is Chancellor, and as [that] 
is larger or narrower, is Equity. Tis all one as if they should make 
[the] Standard for [the] measure [we] call A toot, to be [the] Chancellor's 
foot .... 
JOHN SELDEN, TABLE TALK OF JOHN SELDEN 43 (Frederick Pollock ed., Quaritch 1927) (1689). 
66 Main, supra note 36, at 441-42. 
67 ld. 
6
' LANGBEIN, supra note 41, at 272. 
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circumstances. 69 Chancery, not so confined, was able to adapt and thus developed new 
and distinct equitable claims. 
The second situation in which a plaintiffhad cause for filing in Chance1y-and the 
one most relevant to this Article-involved Chancery's provision of new and distinct 
remedies for the violation of preexisting legal rights. Chief among these new remedies 
were injunctions for torts and specific performance for breaches of contract. 70 In these 
situations, equity by necessity had to work out an arrangement with the common law 
as to what law would be applied and when it would even hear a case. Equity worked 
this out in two ways. First, equity purported to follow common-law rules in its issu-
ance of injunctive relief, and second, equity purported to withhold relief altogether if 
an adequate remedy could be had at law. As explained below, however, these rules 
did not tightly constrain equity in its provision of injunctive relief. 
1. Equity Follows the Common Law (Sort Of) 
Suppose that a plaintiff desired an injunction barring an ongoing trespass to his 
property. Such a case implicated both the common law and equity-the common law 
provided the law of trespass and equity provided injunctive relief. Given this, where 
should the plaintiff file suit: in a common-law court or in equity? A plaintiff could file 
at law and ask the court to issue an injunction, or file in equity and ask the court to 
apply common-law rules of trespass. Common-law courts, adhering closely to the pre-
cise terms oflongstanding writs, would not normally issue injunctive relief. Thus, the 
standard approach was to file in Chance1y and have the court apply the common law. 71 
Equity was happy to oblige this request and the practice soon took the form of the 
maxim ''equity follows the law.'m That is, equity would issue injunctive relief for 
common-law violations, but in doing so, it would follow the common law as defined 
by courts of law. An injlmction could only be had in equity if the plaintiff would have 
been able to collect damages for a past harm in the same circumstance. 
As with all maxims, however, this one was not perfectly true. While it is true that 
equity usually followed the common law, it is not true that the common-law cause of 
action was perfectly transported into equity. We are in the habit today of dividing law 
into substance and procedure, with the fomm court applying its own procedure and 
borrowing the substantive law from another jurisdiction. 73 If this is a difficult task 
69 ld.; MAITLAt"'D, supra note 51, at 7. 
70 See Main, supra note 36, at 443. 
71 LANGBEIN, supra note 41, at 287. 
72 ld. 
73 This differentiation is required in choice of law circumstances, which are common in 
countries with multiple legal systems, such as the United States. See, e.g., Hanna v. Plumer, 
380 U.S. 460, 463-74 (1965) (explaining choice oflaw analysis for state law actions filed in 
federal court); Tanges v. Heidelberg N. Am., Inc., 710 N.E.2d250, 252 (N.Y. 1999)\explaining 
New York's choice oflaw analysis-which is typical of many states-for lawsuits that touch 
multiple states). 
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today, 74 it was virtually impossible to do in early modem England. The law was sim-
ply a collection of writs that prescribed which steps to take to procure certain types of 
relief. 75 Indeed, to the extent the law could be labeled at all, it was entire~v procedural. 76 
Thus, it was no easy task for a court of equity to pick from a common-law writ the pre-
cise provisions that defined the "right" and leave behind the "procedure." On many 
occasions, therefore, equity issued a remedy in cases that had their doctrinal origin in 
the common law but that would not have been successful in a common-law court. 
Take, for example, injunctive relief for waste. \Vaste was a common-law cause 
of action against tenants who had damaged the property entrusted to them. The cause 
of action at law only extended to plaintiffs who had a definable interest in the prop-
erty, typically the fee owner. 77 Sometimes, however, waste was obviously being com-
mitted by a tenant and the putative plaintiffs interest only amounted to a contingent 
remainder.78 The common-law courts found this interest too conjectural to give rise 
to a cause of action for waste. Equity, however, intervened to protect those contingent 
interests through injunction. 79 
Herein lies the problem with the blanket statement that "equity follows the law."80 
On the one hand, equity followed the law because it only acted where actual waste was 
being committed. On the other hand, equity ignored the law by providing a cause 
74 In Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates v. Allstate insurance Co., the most recent major 
choice oflaw case before the Supreme Court, no justice was able to collect four other votes 
to create a controlling majority opinion. 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010). 
See supra notes 39--49 and accompanying text. 
76 JOSEPH H. KOFFLER & ALISON REPPY, HANDBOOK OF COMMON LAW PLEADING 18 
(1969) (explaining that substantive law grew out of procedure: "Comts [were] organized to 
handle a series of specific cases, the decisions of which gradually developed theories of rights 
and liabilities .... [O]ur rights and liabilities as defined by Substantive Law, had their origin 
in and developed out of Procedural Law. HENRY SUMNER MAINE, DISSERTATIONS ON EARLY 
LAW AND CUSTOM 389 (1883) (describing substantive law as "secreted in the interstices of 
procedure"); THEODORE F. T. PLUCiv"ETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 381 
(5th ed. 1956) ("[S]ubstantive law [is] discussed in terms of procedure. The rights ofthe 
palties [are] expressed in the form of writs and pleading .... "); Daniel J. Hulsebosch, Writs 
to Rights: '"Navigability·· and the Transformation of the Common Lmv in the Nineteenth 
Century, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1049, 1050-51 (2002) (discussing nineteenth-centmy shift 
in the common law towards distinct categories of substance and procedure). 
In his Commentaries, Blackstone argued that substance and procedure were actually dis-
tinct concepts. See Main, supra note 36, at 461-64 (discussing Blackstone's attempt to separate 
substance and procedure). At that time, however, his characterizations were more of a norma-
tive aspiration than a descriptive account. See PLUCKNETT, supra, at 3 81-82; Alan Watson, 
Comment, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 97 YALEL.J. 795, 804-05 (1988). 
See 12 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 259 (2d ed. 1966) (1938). 
78 \VALSH, supra note 60, at 136 ("At law a contingent remainderman could not sue the 
tenant for waste because he had only a possibility of an estate, not an actual fee in remainder."). 
79 ld., see also 2 STORY, supra note 48, § 913, at 95 ("[T]here are many cases where a per-
son is dispunishable at law for committing waste, and yet a court of equity vvill enjoin him."). 
RO LANGBEIN, supra note 41, at 287. 
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of action to a plaintiff that would not have had one at law. Is a cause of action de-
fined simply by the harm it addresses, or is it defined by the universe of persons em-
powered to collect a remedy for a certain harm? Or is it defined by both concems? 
This question may be meaningful to modem lawyers, but it was unimportant-or even 
unintelligible-to equity in eighteenth-century England. Equity did not label and smi 
the common law; it approached its task much less methodically, guided by the overall 
goal of ameliorating the harshness of the common law. This necessarily involved a 
departure from the common-law cause of action in various instances. 
Chancery's willingness to enjoin waste that was not actionable at law is not the 
only such example. Consider for instance the doctrine of accident. A common applica-
tion of this doctrine involved lost bonds. If a bondholder, for example, sought to collect 
on his bond in a common-law court, but could not present the bond itself (because he 
had lost it, for example), the court would typically deny relief. 81 Chancery saw matters 
differently, however. Chancery permitted the bondholder to declare by affidavit that 
he had ownership of the bonds but that they were lost or destroyed. 82 If the court found 
to its satisfaction that the plaintiff did in fact own the bonds in question, it would en-
force the agreement as though the bonds had in fact existed. "3 
In this case, too, it is difficult to see how Chance1y followed the common law. On 
the one hand, Chance1y did not necessarily create a new cause of action; an action on 
a bond was a simple breach of contract action that existed at law for centuries. On the 
other hand, Chancery awarded a remedy where common-law courts would have denied 
relief. In this instance, plaintiffs had "cause" for going to Chancery where they would 
not have had "cause" for going to a common-law court. 
Other examples of this behavior-of equity generally following the common law 
but refusing to replicate it-are not hard to locate. 84 Justice Story, the foremost expert 
on English and American equity, summed up the matter this way: 
In short, it may be correctly said, that the maxim, that equity fol-
lows the law, is a maxim liable to many exceptions; and that it 
catmot be generally affirmed that where there is no remedy at law 
Rt 1 STORY, supra note 48, §§ 81-84, at 83-88. 
R2 1 id. at 85. 
83 1 id. 
R
4 See 1 id. § 64, at 55 (discussing equity's willingness to "award a perpetual injunction" 
in cases where traud in relation to a marriage contract was perpetrated); 1 id. § 64a, at 56 
(discussing cases in which the "statutes [of limitations] would be a bar at law, but in which 
equity would, notvvithstanding, grant relief'); 1 id. § 64b, at 57 (stating the general rule that 
equity follows the "same modes of construing the language and limitations of' legal and trust 
estates, but noting exceptions that are "as well known as the rule itself'); 1 id. § 184, at 185-86 
(describing the many cases in which courts of equity, "in relieving against [fraud], often go, 
not only beyond, but even contrary to, the mles oflaw"); 1 id. § 446, at 423 (explaining how 
the action of account (which was used to force a commercial relation to "account" for funds 
entmsted to him) could be maintained in equity against "personal representatives of guardians, 
bailiffs, and receivers" although such defendants were not suable at common law). 
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in the given case, there is none in equity; or, on the other hand, that 
equity, in the administration of its own principles, is utterly regard-
less ofthe rules oflaw.85 
15 
In sum, although equity often adhered to the key elements of the common law, the 
court did not see itself as precisely bound by causes of action at law. At the time of 
the American Founding, it was not uncommon for Chancery to enforce the common 
law through equitable remedies even where the common law might not itself make 
damages available. 86 
2. Equity Defers to Monetary Relief (Sort Of) 
Although equity enjoyed, to some extent, control over its own causes of action, 
equitable relief was still subject to a jurisdictional rule known as the "adequate rem-
edy rule."87 This limit, however, did not restrict Chancery nearly as much as might 
bethought. 
The rule grew out of Chancery's ascendancy during the fourteenth and fifteenth 
centuries. During this time, Chancery practice became so robust that the common-law 
courts no longer saw Chancery as supplementary to the common law; they saw it as 
a rival. 88 Chancery practice even antagonized Parliament. 89 By the sixteenth century, 
Rs 1 id. § 64b, at 57. The historian William Holdsworth has also noted the limitations of 
this maxim: 
We have seen that, from the earliest times, the Chancellors had empha-
sized the principle that equity follows the law .... On similar plin-
ciples equity must put the same construction on statutes as that put upon 
them by the common law. But, if necessary, it would, both in respect 
to the common law and the statute law, go beyond the law, and extend 
the principle underlying the law to cover analogous cases which fell 
under the same principle; and, in order to follow out the consequences 
of its own principles it might be necessary to make departures trom the 
strict legal mles. 
12 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 77, at 259. 
86 Professor Anthony Bellia has explained that, although equity may have enjoyed sig-
nificant discretion early on, that discretion mostly disappeared by the eighteenth century. See 
Bellia, supra note 17, at 789-92. It is true that equity became much more mle-bound during 
the colonial era. See Ll\NGBEIN, supra note 41, at 351-54. But this does not mean that equity 
was as rule-bound as the common law, or that the equitable cause of action closely tracked 
the common-law cause of action. The evidence above suggests that relief in equity was, on the 
whole, marginally more forthcoming than in law. In any event, even if equitable discretion at 
the Founding was limited, equity by then already had established its power to issue injunctive 
relief in several categories of cases that, in the late nineteenth century, would frequently appear 
in federal courts. See infi'a notes 101-17, 216-49 and accompanying text. 
87 See Main, supra note 36, at 451, 477. 
RR LANGBEIN, supra note 41, at 329-35; Main, supra note 36, at 446-47 (describing the 
'jealousy and conflict" between the two courts). 
R9 LANGBEIN, supra note 41, at 329. 
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the common-law courts had become closely aligned with Parliament while Chancery 
remained tied to the Crown.9° Further, Parliament at this time was increasingly at odds 
with the Crown over constitutional authority. Parliament no longer recognized the 
Crown's claim to absolute power,91 and thus was apt to resist the powerful claims of 
the Crown's pet court, Chancery.92 Thus, equity's ever expanding docket was more 
than a petty jurisdictional squabble; it was a challenge by the Crown to the authority 
of Parliament. 
Out of this contentious duel was born a compromise. The compromise worked 
as follows: ''Chancery would not duplicate the work of the common law courts, but 
it would do other judicial work that the common law courts had never done."93 Or, 
put differently, ''equity would take jurisdiction only if there were no adequate rem-
edy at law. "94 If a plaintiff came to Chancery seeking damages for injury to his person, 
the chancellor would tum him away because an "adequate remedy at law" existed 
through the writ of trespass.95 If a plaintiff sought an injunction for repeated or on-
going trespasses, Chancery could assert jurisdiction over the case because damages 
were not adequate to resolve the plaintiffs problem. 
There can be no doubt that the adequate remedy rule limited equitable jurisdiction 
to some extent. The rule, however, had far less bite than its terms suggest. This was 
so for four reasons, three doctrinal and one political. 
a. Adequate by Comparison 
The adequate remedy rule in practice required legal remedies to be much more 
than simply "adequate." The remedies had to be as adequate as the remedies provided 
by Chancery.96 Moreover, the concept of adequacy was highly malleable. Professor 
90 ld. 
91 ld. ("The conflict [between courts oflaw and equity] became embedded in the larger 
constitutional controversy about the respective powers ofthe king (and his Council) vis-a-vis 
those of Parliament and the common law cmrrts."). 
92 ld.; Stanley N. Katz, The Politics of Law in Colonial America: Controversies over 
Chancery Courts and Equity Law in the Eighteenth Century, in 5 PERSPECTNES IN 
AMERICAN HISTORY: LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 257, 260 (Donald Fleming & Bernard 
Bailyn eds., 1971) ("By the late sixteenth century, and especially vvith the accession of the 
Stuarts, the comt of chancery was closely associated with the royal prerogative and became 
the target of opposition."). 
93 DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, THE DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE 20 (1991). 
94 ld. 
95 ld.; Li'uNGBEIN, supra note 41, at 103. 
96 See, e.g., Lewis v. Lechmere, (1721) 88 Eng. Rep. 828 (1<-.B.) 829; 10 Mod. 503,506 
(holding that jurisdiction in equity was available even where a legal remedy was available be-
cause the "remedy ... had at law, was not a remedy adequate to what [the plaintiff] had in 
this Court"). For examples oflegal remedies that were available but considered less useful than 
the equitable remedy, see 1 STORY, supra note 48, § 80, at 83; § 443, at 421, § 535, at 522; 
§ 649, at 623; 661-62, at 633; § 702, at 678. 
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Thomas Main has noted that, to be adequate, "the remedy at law had to be as 'plain,' 
'certain,' 'prompt,' 'adequate,' 'full,' 'practical,' 'just,' 'final,' 'complete,' and 'effi-
cient' as the remedy in equity."97 Obviously, "this language left much to the discretion 
of the chancellor, and consistent with the general principle of equity to address new 
or unforeseen circumstances, the equities in each case controlled the court's exercise 
of that broad discretion. "98 Thus, if Chancery was determined to take jurisdiction in 
a particular case, it was not hard to find the legal remedy inadequate. 
b. Once Established, Never Lost 
Chancery and the common-law courts existed side by side for hundreds of years. 
Over time, common-law remedies occasionally evolved to the point that they might 
be considered adequate. Even in these instances, however, Chancery refused to give up 
jurisdiction. 99 The court reasoned that, having obtained jurisdiction over a particular 
type of case in years past, it could not be divested of that jurisdiction through inno-
vation at the common law. 100 Thus, if equitable relief was once available, it remained 
available-even if admittedly adequate common-law remedies had developed in the 
intervening years. 
c. Ordinary at Times 
The application of the "adequate remedy rule" is how injunctions came to be 
characterized as extraordinary. If injunctions could only be had when a legal remedy 
was unavailable, injunctions were special, not routine. They were, in other words, 
"extraordinary." 
The moniker ''extraordinary," however, is misleading. It may have been true that 
damages were awarded far more often than injunctions in eighteenth-century England. 
But calling injunctive relief"extraordinary" on this basis obscures the fact that, in sev-
eral categories of cases, injunctions were available as a matter of course. In these cases, 
legal relief was per se inadequate and the injunction was the "ordinary" remedy. For 
our purposes, three categories of such cases are most important. 
Suits involving a prospective interest in real or personal property. Equity was 
nearly always willing to intervene by injunction to protect a plaintiffs interest in real 
97 Main, supra note 36, at 451-52. 
9R ld. at 452. 
99 1 STORY, supra note 48, § 64i, at 62-63 ("[I]f, originally, the jurisdiction has properly 
attached in equity in any case, on accmmt of the supposed defect of remedy at law, that jurisdic-
tion is not changed or obliterated by the comts of law now enteltaining jurisdiction in such 
cases, when they formerly rejected it."). 
100 1 id. § 64, at 63 ("[l]t cannot be left to cornts oflaw to enlarge, or to restrain the powers 
of courts of equity at their pleasure .... Being once vested legitimately in the comt, it must 
remain there, until the legislature shall abolish, or limit it. 
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property. If a plaintiff contracted to buy land but the buyer backed out, injunctive relief 
(also known as ''specific performance") could be had. 101 The same rule applied if the 
plaintiffs land was subject to injury through trespass or waste, 102 or if his rights to per-
sonal property were in jeopardy. 103 In all of these circumstances, Chancery had come 
to believe that the plaintiffs right of ownership and possession was so distinctive that 
damages could never be adequately measured. 104 Additionally, even if damages could 
be calculated, the defendant might not cease his wrongful behavior and the plaintiff 
would be forced to bring an action at law over and over again. 105 
Suits involving prospective business interests. Equity routinely intervened to protect 
through injunction the trade interests of plaintiffs.106 Thus, a plaintiff with an exclusive 
franchise could obtain an injunction protecting the franchise. 107 Similarly, plaintiffs 
possessing valid patents or copyrights could obtain injunctive relief. 108 Chancery also 
imposed injunctions in cases involving exchange of money, stocks, and financial 
instruments. 109 Trade secrets were also protected by injunction 110 and fraudulent sales 
were enjoined. 111 The justification for injunctive relief in these circumstances was 
similar to that in the property realm. The merchant or inventor's loss of competitive 
101 2 STORY, supra note 48, § 908, at 90-91. 
102 ROBERT HENLEY EDEN, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF INJ1JNCTIONS 179-95,259-75 
(1839) (discussing waste and nuisance); 2 STORY, supra note 48, 928-29, at 110-12. 
103 2 STORY, supra note 48, § 956, at 139. 
104 2 id. § 932, at 113; EDEN, supra note 102, at277-306, 307-35 (discussing injunctions 
to restrain infringement of patents and copyright). 
105 2 STORY, supra note 48, § 930, at 112 (explaining equity's historical willingness to grant 
an injunction to avoid a "multiplicity of suits"). 
106 2 id. § 927, at 107 ("[A]n injunction will be granted against a corporation, to prevent 
an abuse ofthe powers granted to them to the injury of other persons."). 
107 2 id. § 927, at 108 ("[A]n injunction will be granted in favor of parties, possessing a 
statute privilege or franchise, to secure the enjoyment of it from invasion by other parties."). 
10
' In a study ofcop)Tight injunctions issued by Chancery in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, Professor G6mez-Arostegui has concluded: 
In the year 1789, and in all the years preceding it in which the Chancery 
heard infringement cases, the inadequate-remedy-at-law requirement 
played no active role in deciding whether to issue a copy1ight injunction. 
No comt opinion or order in a cop)Tight case ever required an affirmative 
showing of inadequacy, nor did other contemporary materials suggest one 
was required. It was not argued by plaintiffs, as far as can be discerned 
from the records, nor did it ever form the basis for denying a motion. On 
the contrary, the historical record suggests that in cop)Tight cases, legal 
remedies were deemed categorically inadequate. 
H. Tomas G6mez-Arostegui, What History Teaches Us About Copyright Injunctions and the 
Inadequate Remedy at Law Requirement, 81 S. CAL. L. REv. 1197, 1201 (2008). 
109 2 STORY, supra note 48, 954-55, at 138. 
110 2 id. § 952, at 137. 
111 2 id. § 954, at 137. 
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advantage was incredibly difficult, if not impossible to calculate. 112 Moreover, if in-
junctive relief was not issued, the wrongful behavior might easily persist. 113 
Suits involving a defense not recognized at lmv. This category of equitable suits 
differs in form from the first two. In those cases, the injunction was necessmy because 
damages would fail to adequately remedy the hann alleged; in these cases, the injunc-
tion was necessary to ensure that an equitable defense would not be forfeited in a court 
of law. 114 For example, if a plaintiff charged a defendant with breach of contract in a 
common-law court, the defendant often could not raise the defense of fraud; common-
law courts only pennitted the defense in limited circumstances. 115 In these situations, 
the defendant would go to Chancery and ask for an injunction bmTing the plaintiff 
from continuing his suit at law, a request Chancery would honor. 116 In barring litigants 
from pursuing common-law relief, Chancery essentially barred enforcement of the 
common law generally (to the extent it ran afoul of equity). Chance1y would issue such 
injunctions in an enonnous variety of circumstances. 117 
In the three circumstances discussed thus far, injunctive relief was not extraordi-
nary, it was the nonn. Thus, while it may be tme that injunctions, when viewed against 
the entire body of remedies, were extraordinary, it is not tme when specific categories 
of cases are considered. In the circumstances above, injunctive relief would have been 
easily accessible. 
d. Not Legal, Political 
On its face, the adequate remedy mle seemed to preserve for courts of law at 
least some of their historic jurisdiction. As we have seen, however, the superiority 
of injunctive relief over damages made it an ordinary remedy in several categories 
112 2 id. § 927, at 107. 
113 In the case of cop)Tight, the sale of copies by the defendant is not only 
in each instance taking from the author the profit upon the individual 
book ... but ... may also be injuring [the plaintiff], to an incalculable 
extent, inregard to the value and disposition of[the plaintiffs] copyright, 
which no inquiry for the purpose of damages could fully ascertain. 
2 id. § 932, at 113. 
114 [l]n all cases where, by accident, or mistake, or fraud, or otherwise, a 
party has an unfair advantage in proceedings in a comt of law, which 
must necessarily make that court an instrument of injustice, and it is, 
therefore, against conscience, that he should use that advantage, a court 
of equity vv:ill interfere, and restrain him from using that advantage which 
he has thus improperly gained .... 
2 id. § 885, at 73; see also EDEN, supra note 102, at 14-68. 
115 2 STORY, supra note 48, § 885, at 73; WA.LSH, supra note 60, at 492. 
116 2 STORY, supra note 48, § 885, at 73. 
117 2 id. § 885, at 73 ("[T]he occasions on which an injunction may be used to stay proceed-
ings at law are almost infinite in their nature and circumstances."). 
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of cases. 118 In grasping this, it is important to appreciate how exactly equity got away 
with this. That is, how did equity manage to declare, ipso facto, that legal remedies 
were inadequate-even in cases where such remedies were likely available? 
The key to Chancery's success in this realm lies in the fact that it was Chancery, 
not courts of law, that determined whether legal remedies were adequate or not. 
Chancery managed this feat through an innovative (and contentious) use of its in-
junctive power: the enjoining of common-law adjudication. 119 If Chancery believed 
equitable jurisdiction was appropriate, it routinely barred the parties from filing a 
companion suit in a common-law court. 12° Chancery enforced its injunctions through 
imprisonment, so parties were apt to take this order seriously. 121 
Courts oflaw, in contrast, had no injunctive power. Without such power, they 
had had no way of barring litigants from resorting to courts of equity. 122 Chancery 
could thus determine which cases it would hear. In terms ofthe adequate remedy rule, 
Chancery could decide for itself whether a plaintiff had an adequate remedy at law. 
In practice, this meant that the "limits on equitable jurisdiction were enforced only by 
equity's sense of self-restraint and by the risk of political reaction. "123 For this reason, 
and the three others above, the adequate remedy rule had little legal bite and Chancery 
had significant power to award relief where it saw fit. 
*** 
In sum, English law and equity worked in distinctive ways. The existence of a 
cause of action for damages was controlled by the writ. Each writ precisely defined the 
way in which a suit was to be adjudicated. Common-law judges had no power to invent 
new writs or vary the terms of a writ, though judges could enforce stamtes through 
preexisting writs if the harm suffered by the plaintiff fit within the writ. 
In contrast, a cause of action in Chancery was far less restricted. In issuing injunc-
tions, Chance1y attempted to "follow the common law" but did not view the common-
law writ as binding. In these situations, it is accurate to say that Chancery created a 
cause of action where none had existed before. Chance1y' s injunctive power was lim-
ited to an extent by the "adequate remedy rule," which gave injunctions their "extraor-
dinary" characterization. The rule had little bite, however, because Chancery itself was 
11 
R See supra notes 101-1 7 and accompanying text. 
119 See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text. 
120 2 STORY, supra note 48, § 885, at 73. 
121 LANGBEIN, supra note 41, at 286. 
122 See LAYCOCK, supra note 93, at 21 ("In any case of conflict between legal and equitable 
rules, the equitable rule controlled, because the equity court could enjoin the proceedings at 
law. The rules ofthe common law were enforceable only so long as the equity judges did not 
become dissatisfied vvith them."); MAITLAtND, supra note 51, at 257 ("The Chancellor could 
say to a person 'You must not go to a court oflaw,' and the court oflaw had no power to say 
'You must not go to a court of equity."'). 
123 LAYCOCK, supra note 93, at 21. 
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in charge of applying it and interpreted it narrowly. Moreover, the "extraordinary" 
characterization of injunctive relief is misleading because Chancery issued injunc-
tions as a matter of course in several situations. 
II. FEDERAL EQUITY AT THE FOUNDING AND BEYOND 
The Founding Generation was familiar with English equity practice. The Consti-
tution itself makes clear that the federal judiciary would have jurisdiction over certain 
cases ''in law and equity."124 What the Constitution did not specify, however, was 
what role federal equity would have in constitutional enforcement. As we know today, 
however, "equitable relief has become the standard remedy for most constitutional 
violations, and one which is available essentially as a matter ofright."125 In this Part, 
I identify the roots ofthe federal courts' modem approach to equity. 
The roots are twofold. First, as in England, federal equity lived a life separate 
from law. At the Founding, Congress obliged the federal courts to follow state law in 
common-law actions, but permitted the courts to develop their own "common law of 
chancery" in equitable actions. 126 Thus, as long as the courts could obtain subject mat-
ter jurisdiction over a suit in equity, they were free to determine whether a cause of 
action should exist or not. 127 Second, federal equity was affected by the dramatic eco-
nomic and social changes of the late nineteenth and early twentieth cenmries. These 
changes put before the Court numerous important constimtional cases that were per-
fectly fit for equitable relief. These cases involved prospective rights to property, pro-
spective rights to business interests, or legal actions in which equitable defenses might 
not be recognized-all cases in which injunctive relief had long been an ordinary, not 
extraordinary, remedy. 
A. Equity Unleashed 
If the federal equity power was to grow, it had to be free of any significant con-
straint. At its founding, federal equity escaped constraint in three important ways. 
First, the federal courts' equitable jurisdiction was placed in the same court as that of 
law, thus significantly reducing the political restraints that had hemmed in English 
equity 128 Second, Congress gave the federal courts the freedom to create a distinctly 
federal law of equity-a law that could be (and was) detached from state common law. 
Federal courts were not obliged to, and did not in practice, "follow the common law."129 
124 U.S. CONST. art. III,§ 2 (emphasis added). 
125 Ashutosh Bhagwat, Hard Cases and the (D)Evo!ution of Constitutional Doctrine, 30 
CONN. L. REV. 961, 1008 (1998). 
126 Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518,563 (1852). 
127 ld. at 563-64. 
128 ld. at 563; LAYCOCK, supra note 93, at 21. 
129 See discussion infra Part ll.A.2. 
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Third, the federal courts not only adopted English equity's weak "adequate remedy 
rule," but the courts watered down the rule even further by declaring state remedies 
per se inadequate. 130 
1. One Court, Two Sides 
In England, law and equity had long been administered by separate court systems. 
In America, however, the Founders combined the two jurisdictions into a single court 
system. Federal courts were given the power to adjudicate ''suits of a civil nature at 
common law or in equity" that fell within one of the courts' subject matter grants. 131 
Under this system, a particular judge might hear a common-law action in the morning 
and then in the afternoon hear an equitable action. 132 The choice to put the two juris-
dictions into a single court may seem like a purely administrative decision based on 
the expediencies of the day. And perhaps it was. It was a decision, however, that was 
to have important effects on the federal equity power. 
As explained in the preceding Part, the rivalry between law and equity (and by 
extension, Parliament and the Crown) led to a jurisdictional compromise. 133 Equity 
would only take jurisdiction ifthere was no adequate remedy at law. This compromise 
put equity in the driver's seat, however, for it was equity that had the power (using 
injunctions) to determine whether legal remedies were adequate or not. 134 Under this 
arrangement, the "limits on equitable jurisdiction were enforced only by equity's sense 
of self-restraint and by the risk of political reaction."135 
By placing jurisdiction over both law and equity before the same judges, Congress 
effectively removed one of the tools that kept English equity in check. Unlike an 
English court of equity, a federal judge would have no concern that the provision of 
equitable relief would raise the ire of a separate court of law. Cases at law or in equity 
were decided by the same judge. A judge could hardly fear that he would insult him-
selfby taking equitable jurisdiction.136 
Without the "risk of political reaction," much of the federal courts' equitable juris-
prudence would depend on its "sense of self-restraint."137 Of course, federal courts 
130 See discussion injl-a Part ll.A.3.b. 
131 See Judiciary Act of 1789, § 11, 1 Stat. 78; U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
132 LANGBEIN, supra note 41, at 382 ("Each federal district court was conceived to have 
a law side and an equity side, even though the same judge presided in both."). 
133 See supra notes 88-96 and accompanying text. 
134 See supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text. 
135 LAYCOCK, supra note 93, at 21. 
136 ld. ("After law and equity were committed to the same judges, or at least to judges 
selected by the same political process, the political reasons for restraining equity largely 
faded away."). 
137 ld.; see also WALSH, supra note 60, at 133-34 (commenting on how the merger oflaw 
and equity into a single court ended the "jealousy, hostility and competition" which had ani-
mated much of equity law). 
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would be obliged to obey congressional orders prescribing or proscribing particular 
relief, but as explained below, the courts faced few restrictions in this regard during 
the nineteenth centmy. 138 Thus, to a considerable extent, the federal courts use of equi-
table remedies depended simply on whether injunctions were appropriate to the goals 
of the court, whatever those goals might be. 
2. A "Common Law of Chancery" 
When Congress created the federal courts in 1789, it faced a difficult question: 
when sitting in diversity, which law should the trial courts apply?139 For cases at law, 
Congress hit upon an easy solution. Federal courts would follow state law. 14° For ex-
ample, if a Virginian punched a Marylander in Baltimore, and the Marylander brought 
suit in federal court seeking damages, the court would apply Maryland law-likely 
the writ of trespass. 141 
\Vhen it came to equity cases, however, Congress did not order federal courts to 
follow state law. The reason was simple: equity in the states was in disarray at the 
13
' See discussion injl-a Part m. 
139 Diversity was the federal comts' chiefbasis ofjurisdiction at the F mmding. See Judicimy 
Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78-79. The courts did not acquire their general federal 
qucstionjurisdiction until1875. See Act ofMar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470,470. 
140 See Judiciary Act ofl789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73,92 ("[T]he laws of the several states, 
except where the constitution, treaties or statutes ofthe United States shaH otherwise require 
or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law in the courts of the 
United States in cases where they apply. Temporary Process Act, ch. 21, § 2, 1 Stat. 93, 93 
(1789) (stating that the "modes of process ... in the circuit and district courts, in suits at com-
mon law, shall be the same in each state respectively as are now used or allowed in the supreme 
courts of the same"). The Temporary Process Act was made permanent two years later in the 
PemmnentProcess Act. See Permanent Process Act, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 275,276 (1792) (stating 
that the procedures followed in the federal courts "shall be the same as are now used in the 
[federal] courts [as prescribed by the Temporary Process Act]"). Note that§ 34 ofthe Judiciary 
Act of 1789 as presently amended is also referred to as the Rules of Decision Act. See, e.g., 
William A. Fletcher, The General Common Law and Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789: 
The Example ofMarine insurance, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1513, 1516 n.14 (1984); see also injl-a 
Part Ill. C. 
141 To be sure, federal courts sometimes drew instead upon a body of"general common 
law." See Swiftv. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 11-12 (1842). The prominence of general com-
mon law is often overestimated, however. Federal courts did develop a common law that was 
disconnected with any particular state, but the courts usually refrained trom applying it to 
matters of"peculiarly local concem." Fletcher, supra note 140, at 15 2 7-2 8. In the nineteenth 
centmy, this was no insignificant category of cases. As Professor Kristin Collins has recently 
explained, ""'ith certain important exceptions, including the general common law, conformity 
[ vvith local law] was the general and expected practice." Kristin A. Collins, 'A Considerable 
Surgical Operation': Article 111, Equity, and Judge-i\llade Law in the Federal Courts, 60 
DUKE L.J. 249, 264-65 (20 1 0); see also id. at 253-54 ("[F]ederal judges enjoyed considerably 
greater power to apply nonstate, judge-made principles when sitting in equity than when sit-
ting in law-greater, even, than the power they were allowed under the Swift doctrine. 
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Founding. To begin with, many states refused to recognize equity at all. 142 Equity's 
reputation was marred by "the lack of jury trial[s], ... abuses by colonial governors 
while serving as chancellors, and ... resentment over the discretionary powers and 
royalist associations of the English Court ofChancery."143 Even if a state desired to 
institute a court of equity, however, equity practice was haphazard because "English 
precedents were inaccessible and not well settled. "144 
Without a coherent body of equity law at the state level, Congress had little choice 
but to establish a general law of equity that was unconnected to any particular state.145 
In the Permanent Process Act of 1792, Congress directed federal courts to adjudicate 
equitable actions "according to the principles, rules, and usages which belong to courts 
of equity ... as contradistinguished from courts of common law. "146 In this same stat-
ute, Congress also gave the federal courts the power to make "alterations and additions 
as the ... courts respectively shall in their discretion deem expedient," and specifically 
permitted the Supreme Court to enact rules of equity that it "shall think proper."147 
This left it to the federal courts to develop and maintain their own law of equity. 
Almost immediately, the courts adopted the practices of their English predecessors. 
The first Chief Justice, John Jay, directed the federal courts to "consider[] the prac-
tices ofthe courts of the King's Bench and Chancery in England, as affording out-
lines for the practice" in equity. 148 In the ensuing decades, the federal courts would 
several times enact their own distinctive rules of equity. 149 Equity was thus not only 
distinctively federal, but distinctively within the control of the federal courts. 
This understanding of federal equity was on display in the prominent case of 
Penns~vlvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co. 150 The case involved a dispute 
142 1 STORY, supra note 46, § at 62 n.1 ("Equity jurisprudence scarcely had an existence, 
in any large and approp1iate sense of the term, in any part ofNew England, during its colonial 
state."); Collins, supra note 141, at 266-68. 
143 CANDACE S. KOVACIC-FLEISCHER ET AL., EQUITABLE REMEDIES, RESTITUTION AND 
Dl\MAGES 8 (8th ed. 2011); see also LA\VRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICl\.1"' 
LAW 54 (2d ed. 1985) ("Hostility to chancery was widespread in the 18th century. 
144 AUSTIN Wi\KEMAN SCOTT & SIDNEY POST Sll\iPSON, CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON 
CIVILPROCEDURE 162 (3d ed. 1950); see also LANGBEIN, supra note 41, at 353 ("Chancery 
law reporting remained primitive into the middle ofthe eighteenth century."). 
145 One might wonder why the Founders, with their suspicion of unchecked discretion, 
would adopt equity jurisdiction for the federal comts in the first place. Kristin Collins explains 
that, while some Founders disapproved of equity jurisdiction, the jurisdiction was ultimately 
approved because "the practical need for equity power was overwhelming. Without equity 
jurisdiction, federal courts would have no power in actions raising issues of traud, mistake, 
hardship, or trusts." Collins, supra note 141, at 269. 
146 See Permanent Process Act, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 275, 276 ( 1792). 
147 ld. 
148 Rayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 DaH.) 409, 411 (1792). 
149 The mles were reported in the U.S. Reports. See 226 U.S. 627,629 (1912); 42 U.S. (1 
How.) xii (1842); 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) v-xiii (1822). 
150 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518 (1852). 
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between the owners of a bridge over the Ohio River and the state ofPennsylvania. 151 
Pennsylvania alleged that the bridge had been built too low and that, as a result, 
ships were unable to pass under it and commerce into the state was impeded. 152 This 
impediment amounted to a nuisance, argued the state, and was grounds for injunc-
tive relief. 153 
The Court granted the injunction. 154 In doing so, the Court was forced to take up 
the argument that the suit was not authorized by state law. Were the suit one at law, 
this would have been dispositive, for 
[i]t is clear there can be no common law of the United States. 
The federal government is composed of twenty-four sovereign 
and independent States, each of which may have its local usages, 
customs, and common law .... The common law could be made 
a part of our federal system only by legislative adoption. When, 
therefore, a common-law right is asserted, we must look to the 
State in which the controversy originated. 155 
The suit was not brought under the common law, however. By seeking injunctive 
relief, Pe1msylvania had invoked the federal judiciary's equitable powers. In exercis-
ing these powers, the Court explained: 
[T]he courts of the Union are not limited by the chancery system 
adopted by any State, and they exercise their functions in a State 
where no court of chancery has been established. The usages of 
the High Court of Chancery in England, whenever the jurisdic-
tion is exercised, govern the proceedings. This may be said to be 
the common law ofchancery, and since the organization of the 
government, it has been observed. 156 
To be sure, the federal court did not gain power over the case only because the plain-
tiff sought equitable relief. Without some basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction, 
a federal court would have had no such power. 157 But once a federal court obtained 
151 ld. at 521. 
152 ld. at 557. 
153 ld. 
154 ld. at 564, 625. 
155 ld. at 564 (quoting Wheaton & Donaldson v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 595 (1834)). 
156 Jd. at 563 (emphasis added). 
157 As the Court explained it: 
Chancery jurisdiction is confened on the courts of the United States 
with the limitation "that suits in equity shall not be sustained in either 
of the courts of the United States, in any case where plain, adequate, and 
complete remedy may be had at law." The mles of the High Court of 
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subject matter jurisdiction over a suit, it was authorized to exercise complete control 
over the suit under the federal ''common law of chancery." This power included the 
decision whether or not to even recognize the cause of action in the first place. 
What is conspicuously absent in Wheeling Bridge is any mention of equity ''follow-
ing the law."15" Recall from above that Chancery in England often (but not always) 
"followed the law," i.e., issued equitable relief where a legal right existed under the 
common law. 159 An injunction would normally only issue in a trespass case if the plain-
tiff could later obtain damages for the finished harm. This kept equity somewhat in line 
with common-law norms. In Wheeling Bridge, however, the Court made no effort to 
follow Virginia law (which would have controlled in a suit at law). Even though the 
Court presided over a common law of chancery, it had previously declared that the 
"practice[ s] of the courts of the King's Bench and Chance1y in England ... afford[] 
[the] outlines for the practice."160 So if Chancery often followed the law in England, 
why shouldn't federal courts also do so in America? 
The reason is because the federal courts sat atop a federalist system. "Following 
the law," therefore, would challenge the federal courts' commitment to federal suprem-
acy and uniformity. Take the matter of supremacy. If a court were to issue injunctive 
relief to enforce federal rights only where a cause of action at law would have existed, 
the enforcement of federal law would be subject to the whims of state law. Indeed, if 
federal courts followed the law, they might end up simultaneously ignoring the law-
the law of the constitutional supremacy. This was of obvious concern to the Court in 
Wheeling Bridge. Although there was state law that addressed the issue, Congress had 
already exercised authority over the Ohio River by issuing licenses and approving inter-
state compacts. 161 With a federal interest established, it made little sense to resort to 
Chancery of England have been adopted by the courts of the United 
States. And there is no other limitation to the exercise of a chancery 
jurisdiction these courts, except the value of the matter in controver.sy, 
the residence or character of the parties, or a claim which arises under 
a law of the United States, and which has been decided against in a 
State court. 
ld. (emphasis added). 
15
R Also absent is any discussion of whether damages were an adequate remedy sufficient 
to preclude equitable relief The federal courts' application of the adequate remedy rule is dis-
cussed below. See infra text accompanying notes 167-89. 
159 See supra text accompanying notes 71-86. 
160 Rayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dal.) 409, 413 (1792). 
161 Wheeling, 54 U.S. (13 How.) at 565. The Court explained it thus: 
[Congress has] regulated navigation upon [the Ohio River], ... by licens-
ing vessels, establishing ports of entty, imposing duties upon masters and 
other officers ofboats, and inflicting severe penalties forneglect ofthosc 
duties, by which damage to life or property has resulted. And [Congress 
has] expressly sanctioned the compact made by Virginia \Xtith Kentucky, 
at the time of its admission into the Union, "that the use and navigation 
of the River Ohio, so far as the territory of the proposed State, or the 
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state law to determine if it would supply a cause of action at law, for"[ n ]o State law 
can hinder or obstruct the free use of a license granted under an act of Congress. Nor 
can any State violate the compact, sanctioned as it has been, by obstructing the navi-
gation of the river. " 162 
The other reason for federal equity to ignore state law was the goal of uniformity. 
Lawmakers and judges of the nineteenth century considered lmiform federal law impor-
tant to economic growth and the effectiveness of federalleadership. 163 Professor Kristin 
Collins has explained how the federal courts' nineteenth-centmy equity jurisprudence 
was in substantial part "a response to contemporary concerns about disuniformity."164 
If the state law were to control the availability of federal equity, then the law of equity 
could differ in each state. The federal courts did not want this, however; they wanted 
the law of equity to be "the same in all states of the union."165 
Wheeling Bridge is only one case, but it is emblematic of the Court's equity juris-
prudence of the era.166 The availability of a cause of action in federal equity was under 
the control of the federal courts and was not tethered to common-law rules. As a gen-
eral matter, Congress stayed out of the way, too-except for imposing one limitation 
that turned out to be rather modest. 
ld. 
territory that shall remain within the limits ofthis Commonwealth lies 
thereon, shaH be free and common to the citizens ofthe United States." 
162 ld. at 566. 
163 See, e.g., Collins, supra note 141, at 315. 
164 ld. at 256. Professor Collins also argues that federal comts used their equity jurispmdence 
to provide a federal judicial presence in states that, because they became part ofthe Union after 
1789, would have otherwise lacked the benefits offederal adjudication. ld. at 291-330. 
165 Boyle v. Zacharie, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 635, 658 (1832). See generally Livingston v. Story, 
34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 632 (1835). 
166 See also Allen v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 114 U.S. 311,316-17 (1885) ("Where the rights 
in jeopardy are those ... which the Constitution ofthe United States [confers], ... jurisdiction 
in equity [is] vested by the Constitution of the United States, and ... cannot be affected by the 
legislation of the States."); Payne v. Hook, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 425,430 (1868) (stating that fed-
eral jurisdiction "is subject to neither limitation or restraint by State legislation, and is uniform 
throughout the different States of the Union"); Neves v. Scott, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 268,272 
(1851) ("\Vherever a case in equity may arise and be dete1mined, under the judicial power of 
the United States, the same principles of equity must be applied to it, and it is for the courts of 
the United States, and for this court in the last resort, to decide what those p1inciples are .... "); 
Bennett v. Butterworth, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 669,674-75 (1850) ("\Vhatevermay be the laws of 
Texas [regarding pleading] ... they do not govem the proceedings in the courts of the United 
States .... [If a party asserts an equitable claim, he] must proceed according to the rules which 
this court has prescribed ... regulating proceedings in equity in the courts of the United 
States."); Boyle, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 658 ("The chancery jurisdiction given by the constitution 
and laws ofthe United States is the same in all states ofthe union .... "); United States v. 
Howland, 17 U.S. ( 4 Wheat.) 108, 112 ( 1819) ("The powers and practice of the Circuit Courts, 
in Chancery cases, are not to be controlled by the local laws ofthe states where those Courts 
sit. They are the same throughout the Union."). 
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3. A Modest Limitation, Made More Modest 
Even though Congress gave the federal courts enormous discretion in managing 
federal equity, it did restrain them slightly by imposing the traditional limitation ap-
plied in English Chancery: the adequate remedy mle. In Section 16 of the Judicimy 
Act of 1789, Congress barred equity from taking jurisdiction ''in any case where 
plain, adequate and complete remedy may be had at law."167 As noted above, the 
mle in England had less bite than its terms might suggest, however, for four reasons: 
(1) "adequacy" required that the legal remedy be not just adequate on its own, but as 
fitting and appropriate as the remedy in equity; (2) having once obtained jurisdiction, 
equity refused to relinquish it, even if a remedy at law was invented; (3) there were 
clear categories of cases in which legal remedies were considered per se inadequate; 
and ( 4) it was equity, not law, that determined whether legal remedies were adequate. 168 
As explained below, each ofthese applied in federal equity, thus sustaining in the fed-
eral courts the expansive jurisdiction known to Chancery. Not only that, but the fed-
eral courts even narrowed further the remedies that would quality was adequate, thus 
enlarging its equitable jurisdiction even more. 
a. A Modest Limitation 
In the federal courts' view, the statutmy declaration of the adequate remedy mle 
charted no new ground. The mle was "merely declaratmy" of the traditional ''mles of 
equity on the subject oflegal remedy."169 It is not surprising, therefore, to see that the 
federal courts closely followed the English understanding of the rule. 
First, the federal courts, like Chancery, demanded a great deal out of a legal rem-
edy before declaring it "adequate." An early case, Baker v. Biddle/70 illustrates this 
high bar well. There, the court declared that a legal remedy will be considered in-
adequate if"the remedy is doubtful, difficult, not adequate to the object, not so com-
plete as in equity, ... [or] not so efficient and practicable to the ends of justice and its 
prompt administration."171 Nor would equitable jurisdiction be foreclosed, the court 
held, "where the competency of law falls short of the equurn et bonum of the case, 
[or] where there is some difference in the remedy."172 Speaking of the adequate rem-
edy rule in 1819, Justice Bushrod Washington, riding circuit, explained that "the 
ground of the equity jurisdiction is not that the common law courts are incompetent 
167 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 16, 1 Stat. 73, 82. 
168 See supra Part I.B.2. 
169 Boyce's Ex'rs v. Grundy, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 210,215 (1830). 
170 2 F. Cas. 439,446 (Baldwin, Circuit Justice, C.C.E.D. Pa. 1831) (No. 764). 
171 ld. at 446. 
172 ld. 
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to afford a remedy, but that such a remedy is less complete than the court ofequity, 
from the nature of its organization, is capable of affording."173 Numerous other cases 
confirm this approach. 174 
Second, the federal courts adopted the same categories of per se inadequacy as 
English equity. Disputes involving a prospective interest in real or personal property 
were routinely resolved through injunctive relief. 175 So too did the Court award in-
junctive relief in cases involving prospective business interests. 176 And finally, federal 
173 Harrison v. Rowan, 11 F. Cas. 666,668 (Washington, Circuit Justice, C.C.D.N.J. 1819) 
(No. 6143) (emphasis added). 
174 See, e.g., Kilbourn v. Sunderland, 130 U.S. 505, 515 (1889) (stating that, although relief 
could have been had at law, the remedy was not as "efficient as the remedy which equity would 
confer under the same circumstances"); Boyce's nx 'rs, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) at 215 (''[Even though 
action at law was available], [i]t was obviously not an adequate remedy, because it was a partial 
one. The complainant would still have been left to renew the contest upon a series of suits; and 
that probably after the death ofw:itnesses."); United States v. Howland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 108, 
115 ( 1819) ("[T]he remedy in Chancery, where all parties may be brought before the Court, is 
more complete and adequate, as the sum actually due may be there, in such cases, ascertained 
\Xtithmore certainty and facility.... Hayden v. Thompson, 71 F. 60,63 (C.C.D. Mo. 1895) 
(invoking equity in actions involving fraud by twenty tour creditors even though legal remedy 
was available because multiple "actions at law [would not be] as efficient, as practical, and as 
prompt to attain the ends ofjustice as this suit in equity"); Rowan, 11 F. Cas. at 668 ("[T]here 
are a number of cases in which ... the ground of the equity jurisdiction is not that the connnon 
law courts are incompetent to afford a remedy, but that such a remedy is less complete than 
the court of equity, from the natme of its organization, is capable of affording. see also 
supra note 96. 
175 See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518, 
564-65 ( 1851) (prohibiting the building of a bridge that would have impeded travel along the 
Ohio River); Osborn v. Bank of U.S., 22 U.S. (19 Wheat.) 738 (1824) (awarding injunction 
to protect federal franchise); Rowan, 11 F. Cas. at 666 (resolving a dispute between a trustee 
and the beneficiaries). 
176 See, e.g., Rast v. Van Deman & Lewis Co., 240 U.S. 342, 355 (1916) (holding, with 
regard to state regulation restricting the use of coupons, "that the condition of complainants' 
businesses and ofthe propelty engaged in them was such that the statute, if [the regulation 
were] exerted against complainants and their property, would produce irreparable injmy"); Am. 
Sch. of Magnetic Healing v. MacAnnulty, 187 U.S. 94, 100 (1902) (holding equitable relief 
proper because that postal inspector's refusal to deliver mail to a mail-order business would 
result in "eventually embanass:ing, crippling, breaking up, and destroying complainants' legit-
imate business"); C:ityofWalla Walla v. Walla Walla Water Co., 172 U.S. 1, 12 (1898) ("It 
would be impossible to say what would be the damage incurred at any particular moment, since 
such damage might be more or less dependent upon whether the competition of the city should 
ultimately destroy, or only interfere with the business of the plaintiff."); Watson v. Sutherland, 
72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 74, 79 (1866) ("Loss of trade, destruction of credit, and failure ofbusiness 
prospects, are collateral or consequential damages, which :it is claimed would result from the 
trespass, but tor which compensation cannot be awarded in a trial at law. Commercial min to 
Sutherland might, therefore, be the effect of dosing his store and selling his goods, and yet 
the common law fail to reach the mischief."). 
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courts were also willing to enjoin prosecutions at law where the legal action would 
contravene the equitable rights of the would-be defendant. 177 
Third, like Chance1y, federal equity refused to give back its jurisdiction when law 
invented an obviously adequate remedy. As the Court put it in Harrison v. Rmvan, 
where a case falls within one ofthe "general branches of equity jurisdiction" that has 
been recognized over time, "it is no objection to its exercise that the party may have a 
remedy at law. " 178 The common law (to the extent it could ever displace a federal equity 
action to begin with)179 could not be redesigned to take equitable jurisdiction away. 
Fourth, and briefly, just as in English equity, there was little that controlled equity 
in its determination oflegal adequacy. 1" 0 In fact, federal courts were even more free 
than Chancery to declare legal relief inadequate. As noted above, federal judges pos-
sessed both legal and equitable jurisdiction and thus had no concern that disregard-
ing legal relief would bring adverse consequences from the law side ofthe docket. 1" 1 
b. Made More Modest 
The adequate remedy rule was thus a modest limitation on the federal courts. Yet 
the Supreme Court limited it further by holding that an entire swath of remedies were 
per se inadequate: remedies available only in state court. 182 An early explanation of 
177 See, e.g., Tanner v. Little, 240 U.S. 369, 374 (1916) (making an injunction available be-
cause, ifthe "prosecuting attorney ofthe cmmty ... enforce[s] the provisions of the statute," 
the plaintiff"wiH lose many customers and a large amount of trade and suffer thereby great 
loss and injury"); Davis v. Wakelee, 156 U.S. 680,686 (1895) ("Bills inequity to enjoin actions 
at law are not infrequently brought by defendants in such actions to enable them to avail them-
selves of defences which would not be valid at law."); Wehrman v. Conklin, 155 U.S. 314,316 
( 1894) (approving "bill in equity brought by the [plaintiffs] to enjoin the [defendant] trom 
prosecuting an action of ejectment in the court below, against the appellees, to recover pos-
session of the lands in controversy"); Drexel v. Berney, 122 U.S. 241, 252 (1887) (allowing 
defendant in civil suit to "resortl] to a court of equity to enforce a defence to an action at law"); 
Grand Chute v. Winegar, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 355, 376 (1872) (refusing a bill in equity only be-
cause the plaintiff possessed"[ a complete] defence to the suit at law"); Phx. Mut. Life Ins. Co. 
v. Bailey, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 616 (1871 )(recognizing that a plaintiff could obtain an injtmction 
only ifthe defense he expected to rely upon was not recognized at common law); Hipp v. Babin, 
60 U.S. (14 How.) 271,277 (1856) (stating that injunctive relief would be available, upon a 
proper showing, tor "preventing suits" at law); see also 2 STORY, supra note 48, § 874, at 189. 
178 Rowan, 11 F. Cas. at 668. 
179 See infra Part II.B.2. 
tRo See, e.g., Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321,329 (1944)\'"Anappealtothe equity juris-
diction conferred on federal district courts is an appeal to the sound discretion which guides the 
determinations of courts of equity' ... flexibility rather than rigidity has distinguished [equity 
jurisdiction]." (quoting Meredith v. City of Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 235 (1943))). 
181 See supra text accompanying notes 131-37. 
1
R
2 See, e.g., Mayerv. Foulkrod, 16 F. Cas. 1231 (Washington, CircuitJustice, C.C.E.D. Pa. 
1823) (No. 9341) (holding that federal courts may afford a common-law remedy to enforce 
a state law, but cannot exclude the equitable jurisdiction of the court). 
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this came from Justice Story, riding circuit, in Mayer v. Foulkrod. 183 In that case, the 
defendant argued that federal equity jurisdiction was unavailable "because the plain-
tiff might have maintained an action [at law] in the state court."184 Story rejected this 
argument out of hand: 
No objection can be made to the jurisdiction of the equity side 
of [this court], but that there is complete and adequate remedy 
on the other side of this court. It is no argument to say that the 
plaintiff may have such a remedy ... in the state court. The con-
clusive answer is, that the plaintiff is under no obligation to resort 
to that jurisdiction.185 
Mayer states a rule that was consistently followed in the federal courts. 1 " 6 The rule 
was based on two concerns. First, where Congress had provided federal courts with 
subject matter jurisdiction (usually diversity, but later, federal question as well) plain-
tiffs therefore possessed a constitutional right to sue in federal court. 187 A state, being 
1R3 ld. at 1235. 
184 ld. at 1234. 
185 ld. (emphasis added). 
tRo See, e.g., PetrolemnExploration v. Pub. Serv. Comm'nofKy., 304 U.S. 209,217 (1938) 
("It is settled that no adequate remedy at law exists, so as to deprive federal courts of equity 
jurisdiction, unless it is available in the federal courts. Di Giovanni v. Camden Fire Ins. 
Ass'n, 296U.S. 64,69 (1935) ("Ifa plaintiff is entitled to be heard in the federal courts he may 
resort to equity when the remedy at law there is inadequate, regardless of the adequacy of the 
legal remedy which the state courts may afford. Risty v. Chi., R.I. & Pac. Ry. 270 lJ .S. 
378, 388 (1926) ("[The proposed alternative remedy] is not one which may be availed of at law 
in the federal courts, and the test of equity jurisdiction in a federal court is the inadequacy 
ofthe remedy on the law side of that court and not the inadequacy of the remedies afforded 
by the state courts."); Chi., B. & Q. R.R. v. Osborne, 265 U.S. 14, 16 (1924)("[The proposed 
alternative remedy] can be sued out only in the State, and a remedy in the State Courts only 
has been held not to be enough."); Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 516 (1898) ("One who is 
entitled to sue in the Federal Circuit Court may invoke its jurisdiction in equity whenever the 
established principles and mles of equity permit such a suit in that court; and he cannot be 
deprived ofthat right by reason of his being allowed to sue at law in a state comt on the same 
cause of action. Arrowsmith v. Gleason, 129 U.S. 86, 99 (1889) (stating, in response to the 
assertion that a Missouri probate court provided relict: "[ t]he Circuit Court of the United States 
for the District ofMissouri, therefore, had jurisdiction to hear and determine this controversy, 
notwithstanding the peculiar stmcture ofthe Missouri probate system"); Payne v. Hook, 74 
U.S. (7 Wall.) 425, 429 (1868) (rejecting a state remedy as an adequate alternative because a 
"citizen of one State has the constitutional right to sue a citizen of another State in the courts 
of the United States, instead of resorting to a State tribunal"). 
187 Payne, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 429 (noting that a "citizen of one State has the constitutional 
right to sue a citizen of another State in the courts of the United States, instead of resorting 
to a State tribunal"). This reasoning is dubious, see Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. 441 (1850), but it 
nonetheless played a role in the Court's decisions in this field. 
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subordinate to federal rights, could not take that federal right away .188 Second, the 
federal courts preferred to maintain a clear line between federal law and equity. 189 If 
state law remedies were part of the equation, the line between law and equity would 
constantly shift, and do so on a state-by-state basis. 
B. Opportunity Knocks 
In the prior section, I explained how the federal courts came to possess a robust 
power over equity. The power to issue relief is, of course, important, but the mere exis-
tence of this power does mean that federal equity was destined to become an estab-
lished tool of constitutional enforcement. This would only happen if the power met 
opportunity. This is exactly what happened in the decades surrounding the turn of the 
twentieth century. In that era, dramatic social, economic, and political changes put be-
fore the Court significant numbers of constitutional cases that were perfectly fit for the 
Court's equitable powers. 190 As a result, the federal courts' power to issue injunctive 
relief in constitutional cases was converted into standard practice. 191 
1. Powerful Forces 
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth cenmries, the countly was in a period 
of incredible change. This was the era of the railroad, of the corporation, of mass 
production. 192 Population skyrocketed by forty percent in the fifteen years ending in 
1893, most of it in urban centers rather than on the farm. 193 Commerce crossed state 
lines at will and the American economy began to nationalize. Americans were increas-
ingly working for somebody else, often for a large and distant corporation. 194 
This "spectacular and sudden consolidation of economic power ... worried many 
ordinary people. "195 A major concern was that "not all segments of society benefitted 
188 Payne, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 430 (stating that federal jurisdiction "is subject to neither 
limitation or restraint by State legislation, and is uniform throughout the different States of 
the Union"). 
1
R
9 See Note, Effect of the n).:istence of an Adequate Remedy at Law in the State Courts on 
Federal Equity Jurisdiction, 49 HARV. L. REV. 950,952 (1936). 
190 See discussion infra Pan II.B.1-2. 
191 See discussion infra Palt 11.8.2. 
192 JA.MES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAt"' OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONl\L 
HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 85 (1998); TONY FREYER, FORUMS OF ORDER: THE FEDERAL 
COURTS AND BUSINESS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 100-02 ( 1979); Edward A. Purcell, Ex Palte 
Young and the Transformation of the Federal Courts, 1890-1917, 40 U. TOL. L. REV. 931, 
936-37 (2009). 
193 See FREYER, supra note 192, at 99-100. 
194 ld. at 99 ("By about 1870, ... the independent merchants who had controlled the 
American economy from virtually the beginning gave way to a new industrial order domi-
nated by large corporations."). 
195 ARTHURS. LINK & RICHARD L. MCCORMICK, PROGRESSIVISM 27 (1983). 
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from the unbridled operation of the market economy. "196 The result was "[ c ]onvulsive 
reform movements [that] swept across the American landscape from the 1890s to 
1917. "197 Fmmers fought corporate control of grain plices, industrial laborers demanded 
safe working conditions, urban dwellers complained of filth and overcrowding in city 
tenements, and small merchants deplored the monopoly power of corporate ''trusts. "19x 
Local and state governments often answered the call for reform. 199 They passed 
laws setting tariffs, imposed new taxes, and required licenses for certain activities. 200 
The federal government also caught the reform spirit. Congress enacted new laws 
to bust up monopolies201 and created a federal agency-the Interstate Commerce 
Commission-to regulate all manner of business activity.202 Not all reforms arose 
from government activity, however. By unionizing, laborers were often able to ob-
tain improved wages and working conditions.203 
Big business was, of course, dismayed by these so-called reforms. The problem 
for business was two-fold. First, some reforms (such as rate caps) cut into corporate 
profits directly. 204 Second, the scattering of regulations throughout the nation made it 
difficult to operate a national business. 205 Businesses could perhaps live with taxes and 
rate caps if they were nationally unifmm, but a variety of these laws made interstate 
commerce much more difficult. 206 
Business was not about to take these developments lying down. To fight back, 
however, businesses had to choose the appropriate forum. State legislatures and courts 
were unattractive fora because the political climate in reform-minded states was de-
cidedly anti-business.207 Congress was little more attractive because it had already 
shown its sympathy for reform and, in any event, had failed to address the regulatory 
disuniformity that pervaded the counny?08 The most attractive forum left was the 
federal courts. 209 The courts were well positioned for this task, having a "new tier of 
196 ELY, supra note 192, at 85. 
197 LINK & MCCORMICK, supra note 195, at 1; id. at 29. 
198 ld. at 1-2, 26-28; ELY, supra note 192, at 101. 
199 ELY, supra note 192, at 85. 
200 ld.; FREYER, supra note 192, at 102. 
201 See Sherman Antitrust Act,§§ 1-2, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890). 
202 LINK & MCCORMICK, supra note 195, at 37-38. 
203 ld. at 27. 
204 See FREYER, supra note 192, at 102. 
205 ld. 
206 ld. 
207 ld. at 107 (recording Judge Taft's view that business preferred federal courts because of 
the "deep-seated prejudice enteltained against them by the local population"); Purcell, supra 
note 192, at 93 7 (noting corporations' "widespread and often intense suspicion of state courts"). 
208 FREYER, supra note 192, at 112. 
209 ld. ("This left the federal judiciary as the lone national institution capable ofbringing 
a degree of uniformity and unity to the law governing interstate corporate enterprise, a fact 
clearly recognized by most leaders ofbig business."); Purcell, supra note 192, at 937-38 ("A 
deep faith in the integrity, independence, and capabilities ofthe national judiciary-fervent 
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intermediate federal courts of appeals,"210 a grant of federal question jurisdiction, 211 and 
a constitutional amendment at their disposal that was specifically designed to limit state 
power.212 They had also shown their sympathy for uniform national law by creating 
a general federal law of contracts and, increasingly, torts. 213 
Big business thus flocked to the federal courts to defend itself. The federal courts 
fmmd themselves the arbiter of a massive national debate over the relationship between 
business and govemment. These lawsuits "placed intense pressure on the Court to 
honor two fundamental principles: first, that there were constitutional limits on gov-
emmental power and, second, that the courts would enforce those limits."214 How was 
the Court to honor these principles? Scholars have noted several doctrinal responses, 215 
but, for our purposes, the most relevant is the Court's use of its injunctive power. 
2. Perfect Opportunities 
The collision between big business and big govemment put before the federal 
courts a large number of cases that were perfectly fit for injunctive relier_l 16 As ex-
plained above, the federal courts' willingness to issue injunctive relief depended in 
large part on the adequacy of damages. Moreover, damages were considered per se in-
adequate in certain types of cases, particularly those involving: (1) prospective in-
jury to property rights; (2) prospective injury to business interests; and (3) attempts 
to escape inequitable suits at law. 217 Not surprisingly, these were the exact sort of cases 
among the comfortable classes, the legal profession's eastern elite, and most ofthose who sat 
on the federal bench-confim1ed the vvisdom of [resorting to federal courts]."). 
210 Judiciary Act of 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826, 828; Purcell, supra note 192, at 937. 
211 Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470; Purcell, supra note 192, at 933. 
212 U.S. CONST. amend. XlV; ELY, supra note 192, at 82 ("Adoption of the Fourteenth 
Amendment in 1868 opened new possibilities for federal supervision of state legislation. 
Purcell, supra note 192, at 933 ("[T]he Fourteenth Amendment provided a pivotal constitu-
tional mandate that tmdergirded the transformation."). 
213 See FREYER, supra note 192, at 73-94 (explaining the legal and histmical context behind 
Swift v. Tyson). See generally Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842)(holding that certain 
commercial disputes should be resolved by general common law, not the common law of a 
particular state). 
214 Purcell, supra note 192, at 936-3 7. 
215 See, e.g., ELY, supra note 192, at 82-100 (describing developments in substantive due 
process, takings law, Contract Clause suits, and federal tax power); id. at 938 ("Thus, in re-
sponse to those varied considerations and pressmes, the Court began in the 1890s to expand the 
scope of national law, strengthen its mvn ability to supervise the nation's legal system, and 
alter the rules of federal jurisdiction to ensme that legally, socially, and economically important 
cases could more easily be brought in the federal trial courts."). 
216 See Sidney Post Simpson, Fifty Years ofAmerican Equity, 50 HARV. L. REv. 171, 242-
43 ( 1936) ("About 1890, ... numerous suits to enjoin the enforcement of state legislation 
began to be brought in the federal courts, and were sanctioned by the Supreme Coult."). 
217 See supra text accompanying notes 101-17. 
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that businesses brought before the courts. Businesses did not just want damages for 
a burdensome regulation; they wanted the regulation nullified. Roughly speaking, the 
cases fell into four types: tax cases, rate cases, labor cases, and general regulatory 
cases.218 In each instance, the federal courts issued injunctive relief freely-so freely 
in fact that Congress, as we shall see in Part III, was evenmally forced to put limits 
on the courts' powers. 
Tax Cases. One common legislative tool of the era was the tax, whether it be on 
income, property, or some sort of activity. Government taxation naturally instigated 
lawsuits challenging the taxes. 219 These suits were perfectly made for federal equity. 
Often times, non-payment of the tax would result in a levy on property. Such a levy 
"reduced [the] marketability of [the] property" and amounted to a classic business 
injury. 220 Other times, non-payment of the tax would put at risk a business license. This 
risk included the "ultimate loss of livelihood" or at least a tempormy "suspension of 
business, [that is] not easily measured in dollars and cents."221 Even where a tax debt 
was not attached to any property, its enforcement was often accompanied by significant 
additional penalties for nonpayment. 222 The federal courts sometimes viewed these 
penalties as so substantial that they, in effect, coerced a citizen into paying the tax in-
stead of challenging the tax at law. Where such coercion existed, legal remedies were 
inadequate and taxpayers could bring a suit in equity barring enforcement. 223 
218 See infi'a Part II.B.2. One might also create a category for celtain types of corporate 
litigation that frequently arose in equity. See, e.g., Note, The Case-Concept and Some Recent 
indirect Procedures for Attacking the Constitutionality ofF ederal Regulatory Statutes, 45 
YA-LE L.J. 649, 649 ( 1935) ("Stockholders' suits and cases framed in reorganization proceed-
ings have been conspicuous weapons in recent phases of the constitutional battle between 
business and the New Deal."). In these suits, plaintiffs often challenged the constitutionality of 
a particular law by alleging that, by following a particular law, a corporate officer was acting 
ultra vires. To determine whether the officer's action was ultra vires or not, the federal court 
had to dete1mine whether the law was constitutional or not. See, e.g., Pollock v. Farmers' Loan 
& Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895). I do not include these suits here because they were not 
traditional injunctive actions; rather, they were brought on the equity side of the court because 
they typically involved some fmm oftrust law. Trust law was distinctively equitable and had 
no existence under the common law. See supra text accompanying notes 68-69. 
219 See Purcell, supra note 192, at 945 (describing how, in the late nineteenth century, fed-
eral courts "began to scmtinize state taxation more thoroughly and more frequently, and federal 
injunctions against state taxes grew in number and prominence"). 
220 John E. Lockwood et al., The Use of the Federal injunction in Constitutional Litigation, 
43 HARV. L. REV. 426, 434 ( 1930). 
221 ld. 
222 ld. at 433. 
223 See, e.g., Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936); City Bank Farmers Trust Co. 
v. Schnader, 291 U.S. 24 (1934); Ohio Oil Co. v. Conway, 279 U.S. 813, 815 (1929) ("[I]n 
view of the entire absence under the local law of any remedy enforceable by the plaintift~ if 
the tax be paid and afterwards held invalid by the final decree, we are of opinion that the 
application for an interlocutory injunction should have been granted . . . . Air-Way Elec. 
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Rate Cases. Another common regulatory tool of the era was rate setting. States 
often established commissions to set rates for all sorts of public utilities, the most 
prominent and contentious being railroads. Railroads often sought an injunction bar-
ring the rates from taking effect, and these suits were uncontroversial applications of 
the federal courts' injunctive powers.224 At a very minimum, equitable relief was ap-
propriate because the rates "impose[ d] a continuing duty sanctioned by a penalty. ,,ns 
Aside from the penalty, it would be virtually impossible to determine the effect of the 
rates on the business. Would consumers purchase the same amount even at the higher 
price? This was a complex economic question that equity had long considered more 
appropriately resolved by injunction rather than damages.226 
Equitable jurisdiction was also easily established by utilities who wished to escape 
from inequitable legal actions. The famous case of Ex Parte is an excellent 
example. In Young, a railroad challenged rates set by the state ofMi1mesota. The rail-
road sought an injunction barring Edward Young, the attomey general ofthe state, from 
enforcing the rates. 228 The state argued that equitable jurisdiction was inappropriate be-
cause the railroad had a remedy at law-namely the defense of lmconstitutionality in 
a state prosecution. 229 This avenue of relief-though undeniably available-was ulti-
mately unacceptable because the penalties for violating the statute were so steep that no 
reasonable railroad employee would risk the penalty simply to challenge the statute.230 
The remedy at law was thus inadequate and injunctive relief was appropriate.231 
Labor Cases. Another significant type of case meriting federal injunctive relief was 
the labor dispute. During this era, unions vigorously pressed employers for improve-
ments in pay and working conditions. When these improvements were not forthcoming, 
Appliance Co. v. Day, 266 U.S. 71 (1924); Davis v. Wallace, 257 U.S. 478 (1922); Shaffer v. 
Carter, 252 U.S. 37 (1920); Ohio Tax Cases, 232 U.S. 576 (1914); Allen v. Bait. & Ohio R.R., 
114 U.S. 311 (1884); Litchfield v. County of Webster, 101 U.S. 773 (1879). 
224 See David E. Lilienthal, The Federal Courts and State Regulation ofPublic 
43 HARV. L. REv. 379, 398-400 (1930); Purcell, supra note 192, at 945 ("After 1890, the fed-
eral courts increasingly issued injunctions to block state regulatory actions and began using 
due-process ideas to justify 'rate-making' injunctions and by the early twentieth century they 
were hearing a \vide variety of equitable suits challenging state effolts to establish or regulate 
the rates charged by railroads and other public utilities."). 
225 Lockwood et aL, supra note 220, at 439. 
226 See supra text accompanying notes 106-13, 176. 
227 209 U.S. 123 (1908). 
228 ld. at 129-30. 
229 ld. at 163 ("It is further objected that there is a plain and adequate remedy at law open 
to the complainants and that a comt of equity, therefore, has no jurisdiction in such case."). 
230 ld. at 165 ("We do not say the company could not interpose this defense in an action to 
recover penalties or upon the trial of an indictment ... , but the facility of proving it in either 
case falls so far below that which would obtain in a court of equity that comparison is scarcely 
possible.") (citation omitted). 
231 For explanation ofthis basis for the injunction in Ex Parte Young, see Harrison, supra 
note 17. 
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union bosses called for strikes. Employers then ran to the federal courts seeking an 
injunction forcing workers to cease their strike. Like the other cases discussed above, 
these cases too were well-fit for injunctive relief, most obviously because an interrup-
tion in business was a classic ground for the injunction.232 Thus, "[b ]y the first decade 
of the twentieth century the lower federal courts were enjoining more and more strikes, 
boycotts, organizing campaigns and other labor-lmion activities, and their injlmctions 
grew in both the sweep of their prohibitions and the frequency of their use. "233 Indeed, 
in the early twentieth cennrry, then-Sixth Circuit Judge William Howard Taft admitted 
that he "issued injunctions against labour unions, almost by the bushel."234 
In re Debs235 is perhaps the most famous labor injunction case. Debs involved a 
federal court's order that striking railroad employees return to work or else face termi-
nation by the railroad. The employees violated the injunction and their leader, Eugene 
Debs, was prosecuted for contempt.236 Debs argued in the Supreme Court that his con-
tempt charge was invalid because the trial court had no original power to issue the 
injunction.237 The Court squarely disagreed, noting the value of equity in maintain-
ing the supremacy of federal law: 
No trace is to be found in the Constitution of an intention to cre-
ate a dependence ofthe government of the Union on those of the 
States, for the execution of the great powers assigned to it. ... 
To impose on it the necessity of resorting to means which it can-
not control, which another government may furnish or withhold, 
would render its course precarious, the result of its measures un-
certain, and create a dependence on other governments, which 
might disappoint its most important designs, and is incompatible 
with the language ofthe constitution.m 
With regard to the assertion of judicial power, Debs later remarked "the ranks 
were broken, and the strike was broken up ... not by the A1my, and not by any other 
power, but simply and solely by the action of the United States courts in restraining 
232 FELIX FRA[''KFURTER & NATHl'u"' GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION 48 n.5 (1930) 
("[T]he man carrying on a business has a certain sort of property right in the good will or the 
successful conduct of that business."). 
233 Purcell, supra note 192, at 946. 
234 Letter trom William Howard Taft to Charles P. Taft (Aug. 27, 1901), in H. TAFT, 
RECOLLECTIONS OF FTJLL YEl\R, at 223 (1914). For a discussion of Taft's labor jurisprudence, 
see Dianne Avery, images of Violence in Labor Jurisprudence: The Regulation ofPicketing 
and Boycotts, 1894-1921,37 BUFF. L. REv. 1, 70-76 (1989). 
235 158 U.S. 564 (1895). 
236 ld. at 572-73. 
237 ld. at 577. 
23
' ld. at 578 (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,424 (1819)). 
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us from discharging our duties as officers and representatives of the employees."239 
After Debs, the injunction became the face of federal regulation.240 
General Regulatory Cases. Aside from tax, rate, and labor cases, there are anum-
ber of cases that are best grouped under the label "general regulatory." These cases 
arose from governmental efforts to regulate professions, the manufacture or sale of 
goods, and the use ofland?41 No doubt other types of cases could be added. The com-
mon ground for injunctive relief in all of these cases is that the law "imposes a duty 
of continued action or inaction" with regard to property or business interests. 242 A state 
might force a person to obtain a license in order to sell certain services,243 prohibit com-
panies from using certain products/44 or forbid the use ofland in some way?45 Such 
continued interference with prospective business or property interests lied within the 
heartland of the federal courts' equity powers. A regulated entity, even if able to ob-
tain relief in damages, would simply be forced to return to court again and again.246 
Injunctions could also be justified by the regulated entity's need to escape from 
a coercive legal proceeding. Because there was usually no clear common law right to 
engage in a particular trade, the validity of a regulation could only be tested by vio-
lating the regulation in question.247 Like tax regulations, these regulations typically 
carried penalties for disobedience. 248 These penalties, if substantial enough, were con-
sidered coercive and thus became a predicate to preemptive injunctive relief of the 
sort employed in Ex Parte Young. 249 
*** 
Together, these four categories of equitable actions established beyond a doubt the 
federal courts' equitable power to issue injunctive relief in constitutional cases. As 
239 U.S. STRIKE COMM'N, REPORT ON THE CHICAGO STRIKE OF Ju'NE-JULY, 1894, S. 
EXEC. DOC. No. 53-7 (3d Sess. 1895), reprinted in 0\\'EN M. FISS & DOUGLAS RENDLEMAN, 
INJlJNCTIONS 20 (2d ed. 1984). 
240 See Purcell, supra note 192, at 946. 
241 Lockwood et aL, supra note 220, at 436. 
242 ld. 
243 See, e.g., Douglas v. Noble, 261 U.S. 165 (1923); Bratton v. Chandler, 260 U.S. 110 
(1922); McNaughton v. Johnson, 242 U.S. 344, 345 (1917); Crane v. Johnson, 242 U.S. 
339 (1917). 
244 Weaver v. Palmer Bros., 270 U.S. 402,415 (1926). 
245 Nectowv. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 184 (1928); Vill. ofEudid v. Ambler Realty Co., 
272 u.s. 365,388 (1926). 
246 See supra text accompanying notes 105, 169-74. 
247 Lockwood et al., supra note 220, at 43 7 ("Those [persons] embraced within the terms 
of a statute of this type find themselves subjected to a burdensome limitation on their freedom 
of conduct, existing and efiective independently of any action at law to enforce it, as to the 
validity of which no test may be had at law in the absence of a breach of its provisions."). 
248 ld. 
249 See supra text accompanying notes 227-30. 
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discussed in the next section, the courts' equitable power would persist through the 
remainder of the twentieth century, even with the enactment of statutes that plausibly 
touched this power. 
III. FEDERAL EQUITY IN MODERN TIMES 
By 1930, the constitutional injunction was a well-established aspect of federal 
judicial power. At that time, one commentator would write that "[w ]herever the point 
has been discussed, the courts have assumed that jurisdiction to enjoin the enforcement 
of unconstitutional statutes was clearly a part of the general equity powers, which 
inevitably followed from the English practice of enjoining acts beyond the scope of 
official authority."250 In the decades after 1930, however, federal equity increasingly 
had to take account of legislation affecting judicial review. 
During that time, the Court acknowledged that Congress, if it so desired, could 
deprive the federal courts of the authority to issue injlrnctions in constitutional cases.251 
The hard question in the twentieth century would be how clearly Congress had to spec-
ifY its desires. The level of clarity demanded of Congress in tum depended on the 
degree to which the Court believed its power to issue injunctive relief sprang from its 
federal question jurisdiction. 252 If federal question jurisdiction includes a free-standing 
power to issue injunctive relief, then Congress may only bar such relief if it speaks 
with exceptional clarity.253 This requirement flows from the principle that Congress 
must speak clearly when it attempts to deprive the federal courts of jurisdiction. 254 In 
contrast, if federal question jurisdiction does not bestow on federal courts the power 
to issue injunctive relief, statutory prohibitions of the remedy may be much more 
easily found. 255 
As noted in Part II, the federal courts in the nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
turies squarely believed that the grant of subject matter jurisdiction calTied with it 
the power to issue injunctive relief (provided the standard requirements for equitable 
250 Lockwood et al., supra note 220, at 431 n.23. 
251 See, e.g., Laufv. E. G. Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323, 327 (1938). This assumes that 
there existed some other mechanism through which govemrnent could be forced to obey, on 
average and over the long term, constitutional requirements. See generally John F. Preis, 
Constitutional Enforcement by Proxy, 95 VA. L. REv. 1663 (2009). 
252 Elgin v. Dep't of Treasury, 1325 S. Ct. 2126,2132-34 (2012). 
253 See, e.g., id. at 2141 (2012)(Alito, J., dissenting)( refusing to find that Congress deprived 
the federal courts of the power to issue injunctive reliefbecause it is "established practice for 
th[ e] Court to sustain the jurisdiction of federal courts to issue injunctions to protect rights 
safeguarded by the Constitution") (citing Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)). 
254 See, e.g., id., Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 740, 749 (2012) (requiring 
explicit statement by Congress before finding federal courts lack jurisdiction under 28 U.S. C. 
§ 1331). 
255 See, e.g., Elgin, 132 S. Ct. at 2132 (holding that the power to issue an injunction was 
divested if "Congress' intent to preclude district court jurisdiction was fairly discemible in 
the statutory scheme")( quoting Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 207 ( 1994)). 
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relief were met). 256 The survival ofthe courts' implied equitable power during the twen-
tieth century therefore would tum on whether that belief persisted or waned. Below, 
I explain how the federal courts have largely retained that belief, and why they are 
justified in doing so. I do so by examining the Court's approach to several important 
legislative enactments, including several anti-injunction statutes, the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, a revision to the Rules of Decision Act, 42 U.S. C. § 1983, and the 
Administrative Procedure Act. 
Before beginning this discussion, one matter deserves attention. The reader will 
note that this Part contains no discussion of the adequate remedy mle. In the nine-
teenth century, this mle was an often-noted aspect ofthe Court's equity jurispmdence 
though, as noted above, its effect was relatively minor.257 By the mid-twentieth cen-
tury, however, the mle had faded almost entirely from view, especially in the realm 
of constitutional enforcement. In the definitive study ofthe subject, Professor Douglas 
Laycock documented how courts in the twentieth century came to see constitutional 
rights as intangible, something that can "never [be] bought or sold in any market. "258 
"This is why injunctions are the standard remedy in civil rights ... litigation," Laycock 
writes.259 "[A] damage award" he continues, can never "replace the to vote, equal 
representation, an adequate hearing, integrated public facilities, minimally adequate 
treatment in a state prison, free speech, religious liberty, education, freedom from 
employment discrimination, freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures, or any 
similar civil or political right."260 Thus, even though the adequate remedy mle has 
never been affirmatively abrogated, it has ceased to play a meaningful role in the 
federal courts' equitable jurispmdence. 
A. Anti-Injunction Statutes 
Although federal equity was a well-established aspect of constitutional enforce-
ment at the tum of the twentieth century, it was not necessarily popular. Business was 
obviously happy to have an ally in its fight against regulation, but state and local 
govemments were furious at federal intervention in local matters, as were those whom 
these govemments had been attempting to protect.261 Complaints of excessive judi-
cial interference found their way to Congress and, in the 1930s, Congress barred fed-
eral injunctive relief in three of the types of cases discussed above (rate, tax, and labor 
cases ).262 In forbidding injlmctions in ce1tain cases, however, Congress only confirmed 
the courts' freestanding authority to issue injunctive relief without prior authorization. 
256 See supra text accompanying note 186. 
257 See supra Parts ll.i\.3.a-b. 
258 LAYCOCK, supra note 93, at 41. 
259 ld. 
260 ld. (citations omitted). 
261 See Lockwood, supra note 220, at 426-27. 
262 See Rate Injunction Act, Pub. L. No. 105-175, ch. 283, § 1, 48 Stat. 775 (1934)\codified 
as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1342 (2006)); Tax Injunction Act, Pub. L. No. 75-332, ch. 726, 
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The first of the three statutes addressed the courts' perceived excesses in labor 
injunctions. Enacted in 1932, the law stated that "no court of the United States, ... 
shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or tempormy or permanent injunc-
tion in a case involving or growing out of a labor dispute. "263 The second, which came 
in 1934, was enacted in response to the federal courts "interfere[ nee] wholesale with 
public utility rate orders."264 In that stamte, Congress ordered that ''no district court 
shall have jurisdiction of any suit to enjoin, suspend, or restrain the enforcement ... 
of an administrative board or commission of a State, or any rate-making body of any 
political subdivision ... . "265 Finally, in 1937, Congress responded to complaints that 
the federal courts were "free and easy with injunctions" in tax cases.266 The result was 
a statute stating that "no district court shall have jurisdiction of any suit to enjoin, sus-
pend or restrain the assessment, levy, or collection of any tax ... of any State .... "267 
Two observations about these statutes are important. First, it is notable that, in 
each instance, Congress conceived of the matter as one of jurisdiction. This is consis-
tent with the federal courts' view that their equitable power springs from Congress's 
grant of subject matter jurisdiction to the court (normally, diversity or federal question 
jurisdiction).268 The simple use ofthe term "jurisdiction" is not definitive, for Congress 
§ 1, 50 Stat. 738 (193 7)( codified as amended at28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006)); Norris-LaGuardia 
Act, Pub. L. No. 72-65, ch. 90, § 1, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 101-04 (2006)). 
263 § 1, 47 Stat. at 70. 
264 England v. La. State Bd. ofMed. Exam'rs, 375 U.S. 411,431 (1964) (Douglas, J., 
concurring). 
265 § 1, 48 Stat. at 775. 
266 England, 3 75 U.S. at 431 (Douglas, J., concuning). States in this era were in dire need 
of funds and corporations often attempted to delay or even cancel their tax burdens by heading 
to federal court. A Senate report endorsing a ban on injtmctions put it thusly: 
The existing practice ofthe Federal courts in entertaining tax-injtmction 
suits against State officers makes it possible for foreign corporations doing 
business in such States to withhold from them and their governmental 
subdivisions, taxes in such vast amounts and for such long periods of 
time as to se1iously disrupt State and county finances. The pressing needs 
of these States for this tax money is so great that in many instances they 
have been compelled to compromise these suits, as a result of which 
substantial portions of the tax have been lost to the States without a 
judicial examination into the real merits of the controversy. 
S.REP.NO. 75-1035, at2 (1937); see also Note, Federal Courtlnterf'erencewith the Assessment 
and Collection of State Taxes, 59 HARV. L. REv. 780, 783 (1946) (noting that federal courts 
were "readily amenable to persuasion that the state remedy was inadequate," thus laying the 
groundwork for a federal injunction). 
267 § 1, 50 Stat. at 738. See generally Frederick C. Lowinger, Comment, The Tax Injunction 
Act and Suitsfor A1onetmy Relief, 46 U. CHI. L. REv. 736 (1979) (detailing the efiects of the 
Tax Injunction Act). 
26
' See supra text accompanying note 131. 
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has not always been precise in its use of the word "jurisdiction. "269 Still, it lends sig-
nificant support to the view that the power to issue injunctive relief upon a violation 
of federal law inhered in the courts' general jurisdictional grants. 
The second-and more important--observation is that, by divesting federal courts 
of the power to issue injunctions in specific types of cases, Congress implicitly con-
firmed that the courts enjoyed a freestanding authority to issue injunctive relief. If 
Congress was barring injunctive relief, the power to issue such relief in a constitutional 
case must have preexisted the statutes and would thus presumably remain available in 
cases outside their scope. 
Mid-century scholarship and case law confirm this understanding. In 1948, Herbe1t 
Wechsler addressed the federal courts' remedial power in a significant paper. 270 He ob-
served first that ''federal substantive law [often] prescribes rights and duties without 
also providing for their [manner of] vindication. "271 The absence of instructions as to 
vindication in tum invites inquiry into whether "Congress meant to relegate [enforce-
ment to] state legal systems or assumed, on the contrary, that [remedies] would come 
from interstitial legislation of the federal courts .... "272 Wechsler explained that the 
answer was "uncertain[]" when it came to damages actions. 273 \Vith regard to suits 
for injunctive relief, however, the answer was clear: "[T]he presumption is in favor 
ofthe federal judiciary in cases where the remedy invoked is equitable."274 
Professor Wechsler's account is echoed by Louis Jaffe's work about a decade 
later. 275 Speaking of the federal courts' power to issue relief, Jaffe explained, 
"Congress ... may indeed exclude judicial review. But judicial review is the rule. 
It rests on the congressional grant of general jurisdiction to the Article III courts. "276 
Another decade later, other scholars were repeating the same view.277 
269 See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 90-91 (1998) (noting 
that even a statutory provision that uses the word "jurisdiction" may not relate to "subject-
matter jurisdiction"). 
270 Herbert Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 LAW 
&CONTEMP. PROBS. 216 (1948). 
271 ld. at 241. 
272 ld. 
273 ld. 
274 ld. 
275 Louis L. Jaffe, The Right to Judicial Review 1, 71 I-fARV. L. REV. 401 (1957). 
276 ld. at 432. 
277 See, e.g., Clark Byse & Joseph V. Fiocca, Section 1361 of the A1andamus and Venue 
Act of 1962 and "Nonstatutory" Judicial Review ojFederal Administrative Action, 81 HARV. 
L. REv. 308, 322-23 (1967) ("More often, the nonstatutory review action [i.e., an action for 
injunctive relief not specifically authorized by statute] is based upon a jurisdictional section 
oftitle 28 of the United States Code, such as section 1331, the general 'federal question' juris-
dictional grant .... "); Roger C. Cramton, Nonstatutory Review of Federal Administrative 
Action: The Need for Statutory Reform of Sovereign immunity, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, 
and Parties Defendant, 68 MICH. L. REv. 387, 395 (1970) (explaining that injunctive relief 
is presmnptively available iffederal question jurisdiction exists); Alfred Hill, Constitutional 
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Case law during this era adopted the same approach. In Mulford v. Smith,278 for 
example, the Court was asked to enjoin federal officers from imposing penalties on the 
sale of tobacco under the Agricultural Adjustment Act. 279 In assessing whether the 
district court had the power to issue injunctive relief, the Court first determined that 
Congress had given district courts subject matter jurisdiction over ''all suits and pro-
ceedings arising under any law regulating commerce. "2" 0 Having fmmd a general basis 
for subject matter jurisdiction, the Court then inquired whether Congress, by some more 
particular statute, had withdrawn the power to issue relief. 281 The Court addressed one 
possible bar to relief, but quickly dismissed it because it ''applie[ d] only to a suit tore-
strain assessment or collection of a tax. "282 Having answered these two questions, the 
Court held that it had the authority to issue injunctive relief (provided that no adequate 
alternative existed).283 Nowhere in Mulford did the Court look for, much less demand, 
explicit authorization from Congress that the Agricultural Adjustment Act could be 
enforced through injunction. 
Nmnerous other cases fit the lvfuljord model. 284 When landmark injunctive actions 
like Brmvn v. Board of Education2' 5 and Cooper v. Aaron2' 6 came along in the 1950s, 
it was a foregone conclusion that the federal courts could enjoin unconstitutional action 
without a specific statutory authorization.287 These cases contained no discussion at 
Remedies, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 1109, 1137 (1969) ("Where the conduct is of a kind that would 
not be the basis of a damage action at common law, considered apart from the statutory or 
constitutional provision that has been violated, the officer is undoubtedly subject to remedies 
of an equitable nature .... "). 
27R 307 u.s. 38 (1939). 
279 ld. at 45. 
lRo ld. at 46 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 41 (1934) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
281 ld. at 46. 
2R2 Jd. 
2
R
3 ld. at 46--4 7 (finding that "no action at law would be adequate to redress the damage ... 
inflicted"). 
2
R
4 See, e.g., Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184, 190 (1958)(holding that jurisdiction to issue 
injunctive relief was obtained under "statutmy provisions governing the general jurisdiction") 
(quoting Switchmen's Union v. Nat'l Mediation Bd., 320 U.S. 297, 300 (1943)); Bd. of 
Governors ofthe Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Agnew, 329 U.S. 441,444 (1947) (holding that federal 
courts have statutory authority to issue injunctions against bank boards in certain cases); Stark 
v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 290, 310 (1944) (holding that federal courts have authorization 
to issue injunctions under an agriculture statute); see also Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 
(1946) ("[I]t is established practice for this Court to sustain the jurisdiction offederal courts 
to issue injunctions to protect rights safeguarded by the Constitution and to restrain individ-
ual state officers from doing what the 14th Amendment forbids the State to do."); Holmberg 
v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395 (1946) ("When Congress leaves to the federal courts the 
fornmlation of remedial details, it can hardly expect them to break with historic principles 
of equity in the enforcement of federally-created equitable rights."). 
2R5 347U.S. 483 (1954). 
286 358 U.S. 1 (1958). 
2
R7 The cause of action that would be used today, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, was not recognized 
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all of federal judicial power to enjoin unconstitutional conduct. This is not to say that 
injunctive relief was uncontroversial in the latter half of the twentieth century. It cer-
tainly was. The complaints of this era, however, were aimed at structural reform in-
junctions that affirmative~v commanded various reforms, not injunctions that merely 
prohibited unconstitutional action?"8 The debate, in other words, was about the reach 
ofthe courts' equitable prescriptions, not their historical power to imply injunctive 
causes of action. 
B. The Federal Rules 
Another major legislative event of the twentieth century was the adoption of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 193 8. 289 Before that moment, lawsuits in the federal 
courts were litigated according to an amalgam of state and federal laws, some statutory 
and some judicially created. The Federal Rules changed this. The Rules replaced the 
many different legal and equitable actions with "one form of action," a so-called ''civil 
action."290 No longer would plaintiffs rely on a writ of trespass, or seek a writ of eject-
ment. The law underlying these actions was retained, but the formalities were dispensed 
with. The goal of the Rules was to ''take off all the labels, abolish all the different forms 
of actions, and thus clear the way for the joinder of legal with equitable claims. "291 
By their title alone, the Federal Rules declared that certain matters were distinctly 
procedural and others, by having been excluded from the Federal Rules' scope, were 
non-procedural. What was the cause of action then, procedural or non-procedural? 
Or, put differently, did the Federal Rules modifY the courts' concept of the ''cause of 
action?" The answer, it turns out, depends on whether the suit was traditionally legal 
or equitable. Prior to the Federal Rules' enactment, legal claims filed in federal court 
were, as explained in Part II, controlled by state writs.292 These writs were often all-
encompassing, dictating matters that today would be classified as procedural, substan-
tive, and remedial. 293 \Vhen the rules took effect, the state procedural law was displaced 
by a single "civil action," but other law was left intact.294 This bred confusion, for the 
until1961. See infra Part Ill.D.l. Thus, these suits and most other civil rights actions were 
brought using implied injunctive actions. 
2
RR See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995) (school finance); Hutto v. Finney, 
437U.S. 678 (1978) (prison conditions); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Ed. ofEduc., 402 
U.S. 1 (1971) (school busing). 
289 FED. R. CIV. P. 
29
° FED. R. CIV. P. 2. 
291 ABA, PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE AT WASHINGTON, D.C. OCTOBER 6, 7, 8, 1938 
l\ND OF THE SYMPOSIUM AT NEW YORK CITY OCTOBER 17, 18, 19, 1938 275 (Edward H. 
Hammond ed., 1938). 
292 See supra text accompanying notes 139--41. 
293 See supra text accompanying notes 49, 74-76. 
294 FED. R. Crv. P. 2. 
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writ (or equivalent state law device) had long been the source of the plaintiffs "cause 
of action. "295 
If federal procedure now controlled the writ, from where did the plaintiffs cause 
originate? The new Federal Rules obviously did not displace state tort law itself, but 
they did seem to displace the routine implements of tort law, such as the writ of tres-
pass. Professor Anthony Bellia has documented this confusion in detail and shown 
how our modem understanding of the cause of action has ignored these nuances. 296 
Professor Bellia's accmmt focuses mostly on legal, rather than equitable, actions. 
The distinction is crucial, however. Because equity was controlled by federal law all 
along, the new Federal Rules did not disrupt the equitable cause of action in a similar 
way. To be sure, the Federal Rules clearly applied to equitable suits and those actions 
were accordingly pleaded differently after 193 8. But mediating the relationship be-
tween two different species offederallaw (the Federal Rules and equitable common 
law) was far different than mediating the relationship between state and federal law. 
The abolition of state law forms of action created a vacuum in federal damages prac-
tice and forced federal courts to figure out the proper origin of the damages cause of 
action-whether it be part of the new Federal Rules themselves or as part of the sub-
stantive law.297 No such vacuum was created in equity. Federal courts simply assumed 
that their preexisting equitable authority was unaffected by the new Federal Rules. The 
cases discussed just above in Part III.A-all post-1938-illustrate this well?98 
Other cases address the issue more directly. As one federal judge wrote soon after 
mles were enacted, "[t ]he distinction between Law and Equity, abolished by the new 
rules, is a distinction in procedure and not a distinction between remedies."299 Another 
judge put it this way: 
While the rules effect a unity of procedure they do not effect a 
merger of remedies. Legal and equitable remedies, while they may 
be administered in the same proceeding, must be administered 
295 See supra text accompanying notes 48-49; see also Bellia, supra note 17, at 783 ("At 
the time of the American Founding, the question whether a plaintiff had a cause of action was 
generally inseparable from the question whether the forms of proceeding at law and in equity 
afforded the plaintiff a remedy for an asserted grievance."). 
296 Be Ilia, supra note 17, at 850-51 ("lt was only after ... the establishment of one 'civil 
action' [in the Federal Rules] that the question would arise: Do federal courts have authority 
to create or inter remedies for federal statutory violations? Whatever the practice ofEnglish and 
state courts had been in this regard, it does not establish that the federal constitutional stmcture 
contemplated the same practice in federal comts."). 
297 ld. at 846-48 (arguing that in ascertaining the existence of a cause of action, "[ s] orne 
courts applied substantive principles that evolved from the fmms of action to civil actions 
brought under a code .... [While other courts found that] the new procedural code, which 
displaced the forms of action, supplied a remedy"). 
298 See supra notes 278-88 and accompanying text. 
299 Bellvance v. Plastic-Craft Novelty Co., 30 F. Supp. 37, 39 (D. Mass. 1939). 
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separately as heretofore. It is not intended that the remedies shall 
be either jointly or interchangeably administered at the will or de-
mand of the litigants. The rights and remedies of the respective 
parties remain unaffected?Jo 
Numerous other sources confirm this account.301 Thus, even though the Federal Rules 
dramatically changed federal procedure, and unsettled legal causes of action, they did 
not substantially affect the federal courts' practice of issuing injunctive relief. 
C. Revision of the Rules ofDecision Act 
In 1948, Congress amended the Rules of Decision Act-a statute dating back to 
the Founding and one we have discussed already. 302 Recall that when Congress created 
the federal courts and bestowed them with diversity jurisdiction, it had to instruct them 
on what law to apply in those cases. 303 Congress ordered the courts to apply "the laws 
ofthe several states ... as [the] rules of decision in trials at common law."304 By its 
terms, the statute only addressed "trials at common law"; where federal courts were 
acting in equity, they were free to create their own "common law of chancery."305 In 
this way, law and equity in the federal courts developed on different tracks.306 
In 1948, this changed. As part of a major revision of the Judicial Code, Congress 
ordered the federal courts to follow "[t]he laws of the several states ... as [the] rules 
30° Fitzpatrick v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can., 1 F.R.D. 713, 715 (D.N.J. 1941). 
301 Stainback v. Mo Hock Ke Lok Po, 336 U.S. 368, 382 n.26 (1949) ("Notwithstanding 
the fusion of law and equity by the Rules of Civil Procedure, the substantive principles of 
Courts of Chancery remain unaffected."); New England Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Barnett, 39 F. 
Supp. 761,761-63 (D. Ala. 1941)\similar), rev'don other ground~, Bamettv. New England 
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 123 F.2d 712 (1941); Williams v. Collier, 32 F. Supp. 321,323 (D. Pa. 
1940) (similar); Grauman v. City Co. ofN.Y., 31 F. Supp. 172, 173-74 (S.D.N.Y 1939) 
(similar); 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE; CIVIL 3D § 1043 
(2002) ("The rules have not abrogated the distinction between equitable and legal remedies. 
Only the procedural distinctions have been abolished."); Armistead Dobie, The Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, 25 VA. L. REV. 261,262 (1939) ("Of course, [the new Rules are] appli-
cable only to procedure. It is still quite proper to speak of equitable rights, equitable remedies 
and equitable titles . . . . For an account of the Federal Rules' lack of effect on federal 
equity, see Alexander Holtzoff: Equitable and Legal Rights and Remedies Under the New 
Federal Procedure, 31 CAL. L. REv. 127, 130 (1943). 
302 See supra notes 139--4 7 and accompanying text. 
303 ld. 
304 See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 92. 
305 Pennsylvania v. Wheeling& Belmont Bridge, Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518,563 (1852); 
see also Permanent Process Act, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 275, 276 (1792) (directing federal comts 
to adjudicate equitable actions "according to the principles, mles, and usages, which belong to 
courts of equity ... as contradistinguished from courts of common law"). 
306 See supra text accompanying notes 145-66. 
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of decision in civil actions, "307 rather than just at "trials at common law."308 This change 
gave rise to the inference that Congress took from the courts their power to create a 
"common law of chancery," thus disapproving the courts' power to imply injunctive 
relief in constitutional cases. 
This inference does not carry the day, however. The Rules of Decision Act, both 
at the beginning and after the 1948 amendment, was aimed at diversity cases. 309 The 
Act explicitly accommodated a different approach for federal question suits, however. 
In these actions, federal courts were exempted from following state law "where the 
Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress" provided a rule of 
decision.310 The effect ofthe 1948 Act depends, therefore, on whether an equitable ac-
tion was brought under a court's diversity or federal question jurisdiction. In diversity 
cases, federal courts were obliged to follow the state equity law. In federal question 
cases (which would include constitutional challenges), however, the court was free to 
apply the traditional rules of equity it had developed throughout the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centmy. 
This conclusion is supported by the committee report from the 1948 Act itself. 
The committee explained that the amendment constituted merely a "change[] ... in 
phraseology."311 The Act endeavored to ''clarifY the meaning ofthe Rules of Decision 
Act in light of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."312 The Federal Rules, as will be 
recalled, merged legal and equitable pleading rules in 1938.313 Under the Rules, there 
would be a single code of pleading for all ''civil action[s]."314 Having recast all federal 
cases as civil actions, Congress retumed to the Rules of Decision Act a decade later 
to update that stamte. The committee report further notes that the Rules of Decision 
Act, even before the 1948 Amendment, "has been held to apply to suits in equity. "315 
The committee is undoubtedly referring here to Guaranty Trust v. York, 316 a diversity 
case in which the Court held that original Rules of Decision Act "was equally ap-
plicable to equity suits."317 
Further support for this interpretation of the 1948 Act comes from Herbert 
Wechsler's contemporaneous article, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the 
307 Judicial Code and Judiciary Revision Act of 1948, ch. 646, § 1652, 62 Stat. 869, 944 
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1948)) (emphasis added). 
308 § 34, 1 Stat. at 92. 
309 Wechsler, supra note 270, at 241. 
310 § 1652, 62 Stat. at 944. 
311 H. COMM. ON THE REVISION OF LAWS, 79TH CONG., REP. TO ACCOMPl\'""'y H.R. 7124 
Al39 (Comm. Print 1946). 
312 ld. 
313 See supra Part III.B. 
314 FED. R. CIV. P. 2. 
315 REP. TO .A.CCOMPANY 1--I.R. 7124, at ./\.139. 
316 326 U.S. 99 (1945). 
317 ld.atl04. 
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Judicial Code. 318 Professor Wechsler was one of the most prominent jurisdiction 
scholars of the era and his view carries considerable weight. He saw the statute as 
merely directing federal courts to follow state equity law in diversity cases.319 The Act 
did not address, except by implication, the power of federal courts to imply causes 
of action where "federal substantive law" creates the rights in question.320 In those 
situations, federal courts would be left to discern whether Congress expected the courts 
to refer to state law for the cause of action, or create one of its own. Wechsler observed 
that ''it seems plain now that the presumption" is that the federal courts may create a 
cause of action on their own ''where the remedy invoked is equitable."321 
Finally, this interpretation is also supported by the Supreme Court's unbroken 
practice of implying injunctive relief before and after the 1948 amendment.322 Thus, 
the 1948 revision to the Rules of Decision Act did not modify the federal courts' 
standing power to imply suits for injunctive relief to enforce the Constitution. 
D. § 1983 and the Administrative Procedure Act 
In the mid-twentieth century, two statutes rose to the fore as tools for judicial 
review-one against state officials323 and one against federal officials.324 Neither 
statute, however, displaced the federal courts' general power to imply injunctive re-
lief in constitutional cases. 
l. § 1983 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a cause of action, in law or equity, to any person 
"depriv[ed] [by a state official] of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by 
31
R See Wechsler, supra note 270. 
319 ld. at 241 ("In so far as rights and duties have not been created by federal law they must, 
ifthey exist at all, derive their being from state sources. The question when creation of such 
rights or duties is committed to the action ofthe federal judiciary is unaffected by the [ 1948 Act], 
which retains the substance of the vital qualifYing language: state laws govern ... ·except where 
the constitution, treaties or statutes ofthe United States shall otherwise require or provide."'). 
320 ld. 
321 ld. Though finding this rule "plain," Wechsler nonetheless regretted that the 1948 Act 
did not make it explicit. He stated that the issue should not 
ld. 
be left merely to an implication .... There should ... be a companion 
section ... provid[ing] that for enforcement of all federal rights and 
duties the federal courts are authorized to grant all remedies afforded 
by the principles oflaw, unless an Act of Congress otherwise requires 
or provides. This would eliminate an doubt that the COUltS ofthe United 
States administer a wholly federal jurisprudence in so far as they are 
dealing with the remedial consequences of the federal law .... 
322 See supra notes 278-87 and accompanying text. 
323 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). 
324 Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 23 7 ( 1946) (codified as amended at 
5 u.s.c. 551-59, 701-06 (2006)). 
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the Constitution ... . "325 The statute rose to prominence in the mid-1960s, but its roots 
extend much further back in time. In the aftermath of the Civil War, the newly freed 
blacks living in the South found themselves without any meaningful legal protection. 326 
Racist organizations were numerous and unchecked by state officials. Lynchings and 
other abuses were a common occurrence. Dismayed by this lawlessness, Congress 
enacted the Ku Klux Act in 1871.327 In the law, Congress created two types of enforce-
ment powers. First, federal prosecutors were given the power to criminally prosecute 
state officials who violated federal constitutional rights.m Second, individual citizens 
were given a cause of action-whether in law or equity-to challenge constitutional 
violations visited upon them by state officials.329 
In the years after the law's enactment, federal prosecutors used the stanne to 
prosecute rogue state officials.330 Individual citizens, however, never made use of the 
private cause of action. 331 The reasons for this are unclear. 332 What is clear is that the 
statute laid dormant until a different civil rights era-the 1960s. In 1961, a man by the 
name of James Monroe sued several Chicago police officers for damages caused by 
their unlawful search and seizure.333 He relied upon the until-then ignored§ 1983. In 
the landmark case of Monroe v. Pape, the Court held that the statute did in fact pro-
vide Monroe with a cause of action for damages.334 
The text of§ 1983 clearly extends a cause of action for ''an action at law [or a] suit 
in equity .... "335 Thus, to the extent that Monroe holds that § 1983 provides a cause 
of action for damages, it would certainly hold that the statute does the same for equi-
table relief. After 1961, therefore, the federal courts might have had little need for the 
implied cause of action in suits against state officers. Why imply a cause of action when 
one has been explicitly provided? And moreover, if one has been explicitly provided 
for certain situations, doesn't that impliedly divest the federal courts of authority to 
imply relief in other situations? 
The problem with this logic is that the implied equitable action grew up long be-
fore § 1983 was enacted and became an entrenched constitutional remedy long before 
§ 1983 was discovered in 1961. The key question in discerning the effect of a statute 
325 § 1983. 
326 See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA's UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877 
425-44 (1st ed. 1988). 
327 KuKluxAct, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 ( 1871) (codified as amendedat42U.S.C. § 1985 (2006)). 
328 Jd. § 2 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 241-42 (2006)). 
329 ld. § 1 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006)). 
33° FONER, supra note 326, at 457-58. 
331 See generally Louise Weinberg, The A1onroe A1ystery Solved: Beyond the 'Unhappy 
History' Theory of Civil Rights Litigation, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REV. 73 7. 
332 ld. 
333 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled on other grounds by Monell v. Dep't 
of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 463 U.S. 658 (1978). 
334 ld.at187. 
335 42 u.s.c. § 1983 (2006). 
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on the implied equitable action is whether Congress, by providing one cause of action, 
intended to rescind all others. Were the Court to hold today that Congress meant to bar 
implied causes of action in 1871, the Court would somehow have to explain how the 
implied injunctive action remained a routine tool of constitutional enforcement during 
the ensuing ninety years. 
Not only that, but the Court would have to explain its approach to the implied 
injunctive action since 1961. Since that time, § 1983 has served as an avenue for 
injunctive relief quite often. But not every case falls within the parameters of the 
stamte. 336 In those instances, the Court has not questioned its inherent power to issue 
injunctive relief. Take the case ofVerizon Maryland, Inc. v. Public Service Commission 
of Maryland,337 in which V erizon sought an injunction barring a Maryland commission 
from issuing an order that, in Verizon's view, violated the Federal Communications 
Act. 338 One issue in the case was whether Verizon could even maintain the suit. \Vriting 
for the Court, Justice Scalia approved the cause of action simply: 
Verizon seeks relief from the Commission's order on the ground 
that such regulation is pre-empted by a federal statute which, by 
virtue of the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, must prevail, 
and its claim thus presents a federal question which the federal 
courts have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to resolve.339 
Nowhere in Verizon did the Court consider whether the affirmative grant of relief 
through§ 1983 was essential to the plaintiffs suit. Indeed, the Court's analysis was 
quite similar to that employed in the wake ofthe anti-injunction statutes discussed 
above. The Court considered § 1331 the ordinary "mechanism" for "district-court 
review" and thus looked to whether any provision of the Telecommunications Act im-
pliedly stripped jurisdiction from the courts. 340 Interpreting the stamte, the Court found 
its language ''not enough to eliminate jurisdiction under § 13 31. "341 Thus, federal ques-
tion jurisdiction remained and the Court was free to issue injunctive relief. 
In sum, § 1983 does not impliedly divest the federal courts oftheir inherent power 
to issue injunctive relief. This conclusion fits the statute's nineteenth-century origin 
and the Court's numerous cases implying injunctive relief without regard to § 1983. 
336 Section 1983 only provides a cause of action to enforce "rights," and not eve1y provision 
oflaw creates an affirmative 1ight. See, e.g., Adar v. Smith, 639 F.3d 146 (5th Cir. 2011) (hold-
ing that the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not create a right and thus is not enforceable 
using§ 1983). 
337 535 u.s. 635 (2000). 
338 ld. at 640; CommunicationsActofl934, ch. 652, § 1, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified at47U.S.C. 
§§ 151-61), amended by Telecommunications Act ofl996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 101(a), 
110 Stat. 56 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 251 (2006)). 
339 Verizon, 535 U.S. at 642 (quoting Shawv. Delta Air Lines, lnc., 463 U.S. 85, 96 n.14 
(1983)). 
340 ld. at 644. 
341 ld. at643. 
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2. Administrative Procedure Act 
The Administrative Procedure Act, or AP A, provides a cause of action to persons 
"seeking relief other than money damages" for a "legal wrong [caused by federal] 
agency action."342 The Act was adopted in 1946, well after the federal courts had come 
to view§ 1331 as an implied grant of power to enjoin unconstitutional conduct.343 
Unlike § 1983, therefore, it is easier to read the APA as replacing the Court's implied 
cause of action jurisprudence regarding federal officials and, implicitly, bmTing all 
causes of action that fall outside its purview. 344 
That interpretation has not prevailed, however, and properly so. \Vhere a consti-
tutional action against a federal official falls outside the scope of the AP A's cause of 
action, plaintiffs may typically resort to review on a so-called "nonstatutory" basis.345 
Evidence in favor of this view shows up soon after the passage of the AP A. In 194 7, 
the U.S. Attorney General issued the Attorney General's Manual on the Administrative 
Procedure Act. 346 The manual referred to the AP A not as a new regime of judicial re-
view, but as "a general restatement of the principles of judicial review embodied in 
many statutes and judicial decisions. "347 The two most influential commentators of the 
era-Louis Jaffe and Kenneth Culp Davis-took a similar view of the statute.348 And 
so has the Supreme Court. Take for example, Leedom v. Kyne/49 an important post-
APA case. In Kyne, a union leader sought a ruling by the National Labor Relations 
Board (NLRB) that the union was entitled to certain collective bargaining rights.350 
The NLRB ruled against the plaintiff, who then sought review in a federal district court, 
and later, in the Supreme Court. The NLRB' s decision was not reviewable under the 
342 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006). 
343 Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended at 5 
U.S.C. §§ 551-59,701-06 (2006)). 
344 Agency actions that are not "final" fall outside the APA's grant of judicial review. 5 
U.S.C. § 704 (2006); see Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1371-73 (2012). 
345 See generally Jonathan R. Siegel, Suing the President: Nonstatutory Review Revisited, 
97 COLUJ\1. L. REv. 1612 (1997) (discussing judicial relief from an injury inflicted by the 
President using "nonstatutory review"). 
346 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MAc'mAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
PROCEDURE ACT (194 7), available at http:/ /wvvw.law.fsu.edu/library/admin1194 7cover.html. 
347 ld. at 93. 
34
' See John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 TEX. L. REV. 
113, 135 (1998) ("Professor Jaffe mentioned the AP A infrequently, and when he did, it was 
only to note how 'little' the AP A affected federal judicial review."); id. at 136 (explaining that 
Davis '\mcritically accepted the idea that 'a considerable part of the law of judicial review in 
the federal comts is judge-made ... and it does not even purpmt to be anything but common 
law'" (quoting 1 KEN'NETH CULP DAVIS, HANDBOOK ON ADMINISTRATIVE LAW§ 234, at 
812 (1951))). 
349 358 U.S. 184 (1958). 
350 ld. at 186. 
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AP A because it did not amount to final agency action. Yet the Court reviewed the suit 
anyway, citing its authority under the "statutory provisions governing [its] general 
jurisdiction. "351 This approach is consistent with that taken by the Court long before the 
AP A was enacted, 352 and reflects the widely held view that the AP A was "a general re-
statement" of preexisting rules of judicial power, not a new regime of judicial review. 353 
Years later, the Court continued to affirm the principle laid down in Kyne. "Kyne 
stands for the familiar proposition," the Court explained in 1991, "that 'only upon a 
showing of"clear and convincing evidence" of a contrary legislative intent should the 
courts restrict access to judicial review. "'354 Just the next year, the Court applied the 
"familiar proposition" in Franklin v. A1assachusetts,355 a case testing the constitution-
ality of the reapportionment ofMassachusetts' seats in the House ofRepresentatives. 
The Court first considered whether the reappmtionment decision was reviewable under 
the AP A. 356 Finding that the decision did not constitute "final agency action" and that 
the "President [was] not an agency" under the AP A, the Court denied review on this 
basis. 357 If the AP A displaced all other causes of action, this should have been the end 
ofthe case. It was not, however. The Court went on: "Although the reapportionment 
determination is not subjectto reviewunderthe standards ofthe APA, that does not dis-
pose of appellees' constitutional claims. "m The Court then went on to decide the case 
"on the merits. "359 Franklin thus illustrates that the AP A is not the exclusive cause of 
action for injunctive relief; judicially implied injunctive relief remains available.360 
Thus, even though the AP A created an explicit cause of action against federal 
officers, the federal courts have not interpreted the statute as precluding other causes 
of action, and appropriately so. As one commentator summarized it, "There is, in fact, 
general judicial and scholarly agreement that nonstatutory review was never eliminated 
and may still be used today. It may be used in cases where the AP A fails to provide 
a plaintiff with a remedy."361 
351 ld.at190. 
352 See supra notes 270-87 and accompanying text. 
353 Duffy, supra note 348, at 131. 
354 See Bd. of Governors ofFed. Reserve Sys. v. MCorp Fin., Inc., 502 U.S. 32,44 (1991) 
(quoting Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967)). 
355 505 U.S. 788 (1992). 
356 ld. at 796-801. 
357 ld. at 796, 801. 
358 ld. at 801. 
359 ld. at 806 ("We conclude that appellees' constitutional challenge fails on the merits."). 
360 ThunderBasinCoal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200,212-13 (1994). For fmther examples, 
see Siegel, supra note 345, at 1669-70 ("Nonstatutory review may also be observed today in 
a whole class of cases in which a plaintiff seeks a declaration that a newly-passed statute is 
unconstitutional and an injunction against its enforcement."). 
361 Siegel, supra note 345, at 1668-69; see also DuffY, supra note 348, at 147 ("Traced 
back to its histmical migins, this power [to imply injunctive relief] has a statutory basis in the 
grant of federal equity jurisdiction, which has never been repealed. 
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*** 
In sum, legislation throughout the twentieth cennuy did not withdraw the federal 
courts' longstanding power to create injunctive actions. Congress, to be sure, has the 
power to enact such legislation. To date, however, it has declined to take such a signifi-
cant step. The federal courts thus retain today a power they possessed at the Founding: 
the power to imply injunctive relief in constitutional cases. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court is not obliged to live in the past, but it is free to do so if it 
pleases. In the realm of equity, the Supreme Court has long chosen this path-
referring repeatedly to historical practice in resolving questions of judicial power. This 
Article has shown that the federal courts have long enjoyed the power to enforce the 
Constitution by creating injunctive actions, even where Congress has not specifically 
authorized the practice. Ifthe Court-as it has recently hinted-desires to withhold 
injunctive relief in such instances, it must reckon this approach with centuries of past 
practices. Requiring congressional authorization may or may not be good policy. It 
is not, however, faithful to existing law. 
